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Abstract
This thesis presents three empirical essays on the teacher labor market. Chapter one
exploits the exogenous variation in teacher pay arising from state-mandated pay increases
to identify the causal effect of teacher pay on teacher qualifications. Results suggest that,
while state-mandated increases do raise teacher pay, they lead in the short run to a
reduction in teacher quality as measured by the selectivity of a teacher's undergraduate
institution and the probability that math and science teachers majored in these fields.
This result appears to be due to the fact that, in the wake of an across-the-board pay hike,
newly hired teachers are of lower quality than incumbents.
Chapter two estimates the impact of state-mandated pay raises on the likelihood of a
teacher exiting the state public school system. To explore the effects on the quality of the
teacher workforce, the analysis also investigates whether the responsiveness of the exit
decision to the pay raise varies with the subject matter expertise of the teacher, as
measured by the type of degree held. The findings suggest that general pay raises tend to
increase the retention of experienced teachers, particularly at the secondary school level.
However, the strength of the retention effect varies with the subject matter expertise of
the teacher and the union status of the district. In nonunion districts, the retention effects
are stronger for experienced teachers with academic degrees than for those with
education degrees. The opposite relationship holds in union districts.
Chapter three uses a conditional logit model to investigate the determinants of a new
teacher's choice of state in which to begin teaching, as a function of salary, student
characteristics, and geographic proximity to the college state. The findings indicate that
geographic proximity and proportion minority enrollment dominate the location decision.
The overall salary level does not appear to influence the probability of a teacher locating
in a state.
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Chapter One
The Short-Run Effect of State-Mandated
Salary Increases on Teacher Qualifications:
Do States Get What They Pay For?
1.1. Introduction
As calls for improvements to the educational system resound in public policy
discussions, a substantial body of research has been devoted to investigating the effects of
teacher salary on student achievement. Comprehensive reviews of the literature led
Hanushek (1986, 1997) to conclude that there is no "consistent relationship" between
teacher salaries or other school resources and student performance. As noted by
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (1999), the question of how to interpret this lack of evidence
of a systematic relationship remains open. Some researchers argue that data limitations
and methodological difficulties plague many studies and thus preclude an accurate
estimation of the underlying causal relationship (see, for example, Loeb and Page 2000).
Other researchers suggest that the weak relationship emerging from the existing body of
literature accurately reflects a weak-perhaps non-existent-relationship between teacher
salaries and student outcomes (see, for example, Ballou 1996).
Conventional wisdom suggests that any effect of teacher salaries on student
achievement occurs via the effect of salaries on teacher quality. In light of the difficulties
associated with estimating the direct relationship between teacher salaries and student
outcomes, this paper examines the causal relationship between teacher salaries and
teacher qualifications. Determining the effect of teacher salaries on measurable teacher
qualifications constitutes a critical step towards achieving the broader goal of estimating
the relationship between teacher salaries and student outcomes. To the extent that teacher
qualifications correlate highly with teacher quality, estimates of the effect of salary on
qualifications clarify a key mechanism by which salaries potentially affect student
outcomes.
The direct relationship between teacher salaries and teacher qualifications has a
strong bearing on current policies. Improving qualifications has often been the focus of
public school policies; the federal "No Child Left Behind" Act, for example, requires
"highly qualified" teachers in public school classrooms. Policy proposals often suggest
manipulating salaries as a means of attracting and retaining qualified teachers. However,
the efficacy of such proposals depends on the precise relationship between teacher
salaries and qualifications.
Recent papers investigating the relationship between teacher salaries and teacher
qualifications or teacher quality include work by Figlio (2002) and Hanushek, Kain, and
Rivkin (1999). Figlio finds that, for nonunion school districts, there is a positive
relationship between a district unilaterally raising its teaching salaries relative to other
districts in the same county and the probability of that district hiring "well-qualified"
teachers. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin estimate the relationship between starting teacher
salaries and student achievement, arguing that student achievement itself provides an
indirect measure of teacher quality. They find evidence of a positive relationship
between teacher salaries and student achievement but argue that specification checks cast
doubt on a causal interpretation.
The aforementioned papers improve upon earlier cross-sectional analyses by
using panel data and employing fixed effects to control for time invariant factors, but
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changes over time in unobserved factors may still bias the estimates. In particular,
teacher quality and teacher salaries are likely to be jointly determined by unobserved
district-level teacher supply and demand conditions that vary over time, both across and
within districts. If so, even estimates using fixed-effects models may not provide a
reliable guide to the direct impact of a rise in teacher salaries on the quality of teachers
hired.
The analysis in this paper illuminates the relationship between teacher salaries
and teacher quality by using an instrumental variables strategy to estimate the impact of
teacher salaries on teacher qualifications. Specifically, I identify the effect of the average
starting salary offered by a district on the average qualifications of teachers employed in
that district using the potentially exogenous variation in district salaries induced by state-
mandated salary increases. The next section provides background for thinking about the
effects of teacher pay raises on teacher qualifications. An explanation of the empirical
strategy employed in this analysis follows. I then describe the data used and the salary
mandates studied. The remaining sections present results and conclusions.
1.2. Background
The variation used in this paper to identify the effects of salaries on qualifications
comes from state mandates intended to raise teacher salaries throughout the state. In the
long run, such widespread pay raises for teachers will likely increase the number of
college graduates choosing to teach. 1 The overall increase in pay potentially attracts both
1 See, for example, Dolton (1990) and Manski (1987).
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low-quality and high-quality individuals. If districts hire better-qualified teachers from
the enlarged applicant pool, then the qualifications of teachers may rise on average. 2
The short run effects, however, may differ substantially from the long run effects.
Previous researchers have suggested that school districts may face upward-sloping supply
curves due to the limited mobility of teachers. 3 Some school districts are geographically
separated; in at least some regions, salary differentials may not be large enough to cover
the moving costs associated with switching districts. The psychic costs of moving may
be substantial for many teachers. Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2003) find
evidence that teachers prefer to teach in areas very close to their hometowns and
conclude that the geographical scope of teacher labor markets is small. Married teachers
that are secondary earners in their household are further limited in their mobility, as they
are in part constrained by their spouses' jobs. The possibility of an upward-sloping labor
supply curve seems particularly plausible when viewing labor supply at the state level, as
these factors potentially limit movement across states even more than movement across
districts. 4 Such an upward-sloping supply curve implies that raising salaries may lead to
higher employment. The effect of higher salaries on qualifications will then depend, in
part, on the qualifications of newly hired teachers relative to the qualifications of existing
teachers.
2 Ballou (1996) finds evidence that districts do not necessarily hire the best-qualified applicants. Ballou
and Podgursky (1995) argue that perverse effects of across-the-board salary increases on retention rates and
vacancy rates imply that the quality of the teacher workforce will not improve much-and may even
decline-following such general pay raises.
3 See Merrifield (1999) for a review of the literature.
4 The source of variation in salaries used in this analysis occurs at the state level. As reported below, I find
evidence of upward-sloping short-run supply curves.
9
There is some reason to believe that teachers hired immediately following the
salary raises may be less qualified than incumbent teachers. As discussed below, the data
used in this analysis shows some evidence of a secular decline in teacher qualifications,
with teachers who graduated more recently being less qualified than teachers from earlier
cohorts. Consequently, hiring more recent college graduates in response to a salary
increase may decrease overall teacher qualifications in the short run.5
Pay raises may also affect qualifications via the effects on the retention of existing
teachers. While previous work indicates that raising salaries tends to increase retention
rates overall, Murnane and Olsen (1990) find evidence that this effect is weaker for "the
most academically able" teachers. 6 If less-qualified teachers are retained at greater rates
than better-qualified teachers are, this retention effect may actually contribute to an
overall decline in teacher qualifications in the short run.
The California Class Size Reduction program demonstrates the possibility of
declining teacher qualifications in the short run. Encouraged in part by evidence of
positive achievement effects of smaller class sizes from the Tennessee STAR program,
the California legislature devoted billions of dollars to reduce class sizes in kindergarten
through the third grade. The employment of teachers in the early grades increased
dramatically as districts staffed the smaller classes. Evaluations of the California
s More generally, the effect depends on the characteristics and qualifications of the marginal individual
induced by the pay raise to enter (or return to) teaching. Consider, for example, women who may enter
teaching from outside of the labor force. These women may be well-qualified individuals who are highly
productive in home production. Alternatively, they may be less-qualified individuals with relatively low
earnings potential. In future work I will address this empirical question of the qualifications of the
marginal entrant into teaching.
6 Other studies investigating the relationship between salaries and teacher attrition include Theobald and
Gritz (1996), Murnane et al. (1991), Murnane and Olsen (1989), and Baugh and Stone (1982).
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program indicate that the program has led in the short run to a substantial decline in the
average qualifications of teachers.7 While the potential positive employment effects of
state salary mandates are not expected to be nearly as sharp as the employment effects
associated with the class size reduction program, the California program serves as an
example of the negative effects on qualifications that may result from policies that lead to
rapid hiring.
This analysis uses data from the two most recent rounds of the Schools and
Staffing Survey to provide evidence on the short-run effects of teacher salary increases
on average teacher qualifications. In future work, I intend to use different data sources to
examine the long-run effects of pay raises on qualifications.
1.3. Empirical Strategy
This analysis seeks to identify the relationship between the teacher salary offered
by a district d in state s at time t and the average qualifications of teachers working in
district d in state s at time t. A simple form of this key relationship may be expressed as
follows:
Qdst = Xdst'i31 + 32Ln(W)dst s Yt + Eds(1)
where Qdst is an average qualification, Xdst is a vector of district characteristics affecting
the supply of and demand for teachers, Ln(W)dst, is the log of the teacher salary offered
by the district, 13Pi and 12 are parameters to be estimated, 6s are state fixed effects, yt are
7 See, for example, Bohrnstedt and Stecher (2002).
year dummies, and E is a stochastic error term. When properly identified, the parameter
132 may be interpreted as the causal effect of teacher salary on the average qualifications
of teachers employed in a given district.
Estimating this equation using the common regression method of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) may lead to a biased estimate of the parameter of interest, 32. The
problem stems from the likely possibility that a district's salary and the qualifications of a
district's teachers are simultaneously determined. That is, in addition to changes in
salary causing changes in teacher qualifications, existing teacher qualifications may
influence the salaries offered by districts. If better-qualified teachers self-select into a
district for non-salary reasons, over time these better-qualified teachers may demand
higher wages and ultimately drive up salaries. In this scenario, OLS estimation would
indicate a positive relationship between teacher salaries and teacher qualifications-but
this relationship would not be causal. The positive relationship results from a more
mechanical finding that districts pay more for better-qualified teachers.
Compensating differentials may also cloud the interpretation of 132. Districts may
increase their salaries as a way of compensating teachers for working conditions
generally deemed unfavorable. If the regression equation does not control fully for these
working conditions then the effect of the unfavorable conditions will load on to the salary
variable, confounding the estimated relationship between salaries and qualifications.
I seek to identify 132 using potentially exogenous variation in district salaries. In
particular, I instrument for district salaries using state-mandated salary increases.
Assuming district compliance, such mandates are likely highly correlated with increases
in district salaries. Since state legislatures rather than district school boards set the
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mandates, the resulting salary increases are not necessarily determined by the
qualifications of teachers in particular districts. Districts under state salary mandates
arguably increase salaries not because of changing teacher qualifications or unobservable
reasons that may be related to the qualifications of its existing teachers, but rather
because the state orders the salary increase.
To implement this approach, I employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimation strategy. The salary mandates studied occurred between 1993 and 1999. I
construct the instrument as a time-varying dummy variable: in 1993, the variable equals
zero for all districts; in 1999, the variable equals one if the district is located in a state
that mandates a teacher salary increase during the period studied and zero otherwise.
Since the mandate varies at the state level, I use a fixed effects specification to capture
time-invariant characteristics of the states. This strategy attempts to identify the average
causal effect of salary increases by essentially comparing the average qualifications of
teachers in districts "forced" to increase their teacher salaries to the average qualifications
of teachers in districts not forced to increase their teacher salaries. I estimate the
following 2SLS model:
Ln(W)dst := Xdst'ai+ a 2Lawst + 6s + Yt + Vdst (2)
Qdst = Xdst'Pi + 032Ln(W)dst + 6s + Yt A + dst (3)
where Lawst is the salary mandate dummy variable used in the second stage as an
instrument for district salaries. Teacher qualifications analyzed include three measures
that previous analyses suggests may be positively related to student achievement:
selectivity of the undergraduate institution attended by the teacher, the average SAT
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score of the undergraduate institution attended, and an indicator of whether math and
science teachers majored in math or science.
1.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The school district data used in this study come primarily from the Schools and
Staffing Survey (SASS). Designed to be representative at the state as well as the national
level for public schools, the SASS obtains detailed information from school districts,
school administrators, and teachers regarding school characteristics and policies. Data on
salaries, enrollment, fraction minority students and other district characteristics are from
the district record. The teacher component of the SASS features a variety of variables
relating to teacher qualifications including major for each degree and undergraduate
institution attended. I link the undergraduate institution information to data from college
guides and surveys on the selectivity and average SAT score of the undergraduate
institution.9 For each of the qualifications analyzed, I obtain the average qualification of
a given district by aggregating individual data from the teacher record to the district level
using sampling weights.
8 Ehrenberg and Brewer (1994) find a positive relationship between student test scores and the selectivity
of a teacher's undergraduate institution. Ferguson (1991) and Ehrenberg and Brewer(1995) find a positive
relationship between student test scores and teacher verbal aptitude scores. Goldhaber and Brewer (1996)
find a positive relationship between student math/science test scores and teachers having a major in
math/science; they do not find a statistically significant relationship between test scores and teachers'
majors for English or history. In this analysis, a math teacher is considered to have a major in math if she
attained a bachelor's, master's, advanced graduate, educational specialist, doctorate, or professional degree
with a major in mathematics, statistics, physics, or engineering. A science teacher is considered to have a
major in science if she attained a bachelor's, master's, advanced graduate, educational specialist, doctorate,
or professional degree with a major in biology/life science, chemistry, geology/earth science, another
natural science, physics, or engineering.
9 The selectivity data come from the 1990 Lovejoy's guide. The reported selectivity ranking ranges from 1
to 5, with 5 denoting the most selective institution. For readability, I rescale the ranking so that the index
ranges from 20 to 100, with 100 denoting the most selective institution. The average SAT data come from
a 1983 survey conducted by the Higher Education Research Institute.
Data regarding state-mandated salary increases derives primarily from the
"Legislative Update" feature of Education Week. These updates include summaries of
education-related bills enacted by state legislatures. I searched the updates and compiled
bills related to teacher pay for the years 1993 through 1999. In an effort to improve the
accuracy of the data, I read state education statutes to ascertain additional details
regarding the salary mandates. Finally, I supplemented the salary information with
reports produced by the Southern Regional Education Board.
To assess the impact of changes in teacher salaries, I utilize repeated observations
of the districts. My main sample consists of districts sampled in both the 1993-94 and
1999-2000 rounds of the SASS. 10 I run the main analysis on 2,214 districts with
matching teacher records. Due to the sampling procedure using in the SASS, large
school districts are overrepresented in my sample. The overrepresentation of large school
districts, which employ larger numbers of teachers, means that the estimates are likely to
capture the effect of salary increases on the qualification of the average teacher rather
than the (unweighted) average district.
1.4.1. Description ofsalary mandates
As summarized in Table 1.1, nineteen states mandated salary increases between
1993 and 1999. The legislative reports indicate that these mandates were generally
funded. States differed in the number of increases passed during the time period studied
as well as in the nature of the increases. Most states implemented more than one increase
10 There are four rounds of the SASS: 1987-88, 1990-91, 1993-94, and 1999-2000. The 1990-91 round
does not contain data on the teacher's undergraduate institution and thus cannot be use to obtain the teacher
qualifications analyzed here. I use data from the 1987-88 round to perform falsification checks.
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during the period, but did not legislate pay raises in every year. In the majority of cases,
mandates took the form of across-the-board percentage increases; Georgia, for example,
funded several 6 percent pay raises for teachers. In some instances, the pay raises
depended on the education and experience level of the teacher or on the wealth of the
district. Arkansas, for example, increased minimum salaries for various education-
experience levels, while one of the mandates passed in Louisiana provided raises ranging
from $750 to $1,200 depending on the relative wealth of the school district.1I
Reasons for the mandates varied as well. Some legislatures described the
mandates as cost-of-living increases. In other cases, such as Georgia, the governor urged
the mandates as part of a drive to align state salaries with the national average salary.
One of the mandates passed in Tennessee occurred in response to a court order to address
funding inequities and equalize teacher pay across large and small districts. The political
climate likely played a role as well, perhaps explaining why in New Mexico, for
example, a proposal to increase teacher salaries for the 1997-98 school year failed before
the passage of a nine percent pay raise for the 1998-99 school year. Given the varied
factors influencing the passing of the mandates, the assumption that, overall, these
mandates were not systematically related to underlying state trends in teacher
qualifications seems plausible. Falsification tests of this identifying assumption are
implemented below.
1 The present analysis investigates the average effect of all salary mandates by using a single dummy that
turns on in 1999 if the district in which the state is located passed at least one increase between 1993 and
1999. The next phase of my research will further parameterize the law dummy to explore the potentially
different impacts of the various types of mandates and to exploit differences in the frequency and timing of
the pay raises.
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1.4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1.2 presents a comparison of summary statistics for districts in states with
and without salary mandates. The two groups of districts are broadly similar on most
characteristics. The largest difference occurs with unionization; districts in states without
mandates have higher rates of unionization than districts in states with mandates. These
states with increases were located primarily in the South, which tend to be nonunion. In
the present analysis, I include dummies for the unionization status of the districts; in the
next stage of this work, I will attempt to control for differences in unionization more fully
by interacting the unionization status with the instrument and exploring whether the
effects of salary vary with unionization.
1.5. Effects of State Mandates on District Salaries
The first-stage estimates presented in Table 1.3 indicate that state-mandated
salary increases did, in fact, lead to increases in district salaries. On average, districts
located in states that mandated pay raises for teachers increased their salaries by about 7
percent relative to districts located in states without such salary mandates. 12 Columns 2
through 4 present estimates of the average effects of a state mandate on the log salaries
offered at three education-experience levels: bachelor's degree with zero years of
teaching experience, master's degree with zero years of experience, and master's degree
with twenty years of experience, respectively. As the estimates are similar across
education-experience levels, the remainder of the analysis will use the average of the
12 All salaries are converted to 1999 dollars using the CPI-U.
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salaries offered to beginning teachers with a bachelor's degree or a master's degree as the
district salary.
1.5.1. Effect of state mandates on state funding
As a check of whether these mandates were funded as stated in the legislative
reports, I estimate the relationship between the law dummy and state funds given to
districts for elementary and secondary education. I calculate the funding variable,
"transfer," as the sum of state governmental expenditures to independent school districts
and to general-purpose governments for elementary and secondary education. 3  The
results reported in Table 1.4 indicate that state transfers for elementary and secondary
education increased in states with salary mandates relative to states without mandates, as
would be expected if these mandates were funded. On average, the salary mandates
increased the level of transfers by about 13 percent and the level of transfers per pupil by
about 14 percent. The sizes of these estimates exceed the average impact of the mandates
on salaries reported in Table 1.3. As reported below, I find evidence that the number of
teachers employed increases following the pay raises. Districts may have used the state
funds to hire more teachers in addition to paying existing teachers more.
13 State intergovernmental expenditures to general purpose governments are included to capture funding to
dependent school districts, which are classified as agencies of another government, such as a county,
municipality, or township. These regressions exclude Hawaii, which has only one, statewide school district
and thus has no intergovernmental transfers to districts. The expenditures are measured in 1999 dollars.
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1.5.2. Falsification test
To be valid instruments for district salaries, the state salary mandates must be
uncorrelated with confounding factors affecting teacher salary levels. One such
confounding factor is preexisting trends. To check for preexisting trends, I regress log
district teacher salaries on the law dummy for a period prior to the 1993 to 1999 period
studied. If, for example, the apparent increase in salaries offered by districts in states
with mandates between 1993 and 1999 resulted primarily from mean reversion, then the
estimate of the law dummy would be negative in the pre-period. Alternatively, a positive
coefficient would suggest that districts in states with and without mandates had been
raising salaries even prior to the law adoptions, in which case the laws probably did not
cause salaries to rise but rather codified current practice.
Table 1.5 presents the results of this falsification test. In order to be able to
compare salary changes over the various time periods, I restrict the sample to districts
repeated in all four rounds of the SASS. 14 As with the sample used in the main analysis,
states that mandated a salary increase between 1993 and 1999 (i.e., during the treatment
period) saw significant relative increases in teacher salaries between 1993 and 1999. The
same relationship does not hold for earlier periods, however. Salaries paid by a district
between 1987 and 1990 or during the longer time period of 1987 to 1993 are unrelated to
whether a state subsequently mandated an increase between 1993 and 1999. The
coefficients on the law dummy for the pre-periods are negative, suggesting a slight
14 Union status and fraction of students approved for free or reduced price lunch are not available in the
1987-88 and 1990-91 rounds of the SASS.
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degree of mean reversion, but the coefficients are small in magnitude and are not
statistically significant.
1.6. Effects of Salary on Employment
Instrumental variable estimates reported in Table 1.6 suggest that teacher pay
raises increase the number of teachers hired. I find that a 10 percent salary increase
leads, on average, to a 5.4 percent increase in the number of full-time equivalent teachers
employed. The increase in the number of teachers employed translates into a reduction in
the student-teacher ratio. A 10 percent salary increase is associated with an average
decrease of 0.8 students per full-time equivalent teacher in the district. Comparing the IV
estimates reported in columns (2) and (4) to the OLS estimates reported in columns (1)
and (3) suggests a downward bias in OLS estimates of the effect of teacher salaries on the
number of teachers employed. The positive employment effects are consistent with the
possibility raised earlier that short-run labor supply curves are upward-sloping due to
limits on teacher mobility.' 5 At the same time, districts generally have a fixed number of
teacher slots to fill. Hence, even a highly elastic supply response to a salary increase will
lead to a limited quantity of new hiring.
Table 1.7 presents estimates of the effect of teacher salaries on the overall
experience of teachers and on their tenure with a particular school. The overall effect on
experience is negative, as would be expected if the salary raises result in an influx of new
teachers into the profession, but the estimate is imprecisely estimated and not
15 Papers finding evidence of districts possessing some degree of monopsony power include Merrifield
(1999), Luizer and Thornton (1986), and Landon and Baird (1971).
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significantly different from zero. The imprecision of the estimate may reflect offsetting
effects on average experience; in addition to increasing the number of beginning teachers,
pay raises may also increase the retention of experienced teachers, thereby driving up
average experience levels. While the overall effect on the average experience of teachers
in a district may not change, the IV estimates reported in column (4) suggests that salary
hikes decrease the average number of years that a teacher has taught at her current school.
This decrease in tenure with current school may result from both an increase in the
number of beginning teachers and transfers of teachers across schools.
1.7. Effects of Salary on Teacher Qualifications
This section investigates the relationship between the average starting teacher
salary offered by a district and the average qualifications of teachers employed in that
district. Tables 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 report estimates of the effect of teacher salaries on the
selectivity of the undergraduate institution attended, the average SAT of the
undergraduate institution attended, and the fraction of math and science teachers who
majored in math or science, respectively. The first two columns of each table present
OLS and IV estimates for the qualification averaged over all sampled teachers in the
district. The next two columns present estimates for the qualification averaged over
newly hired teachers in the district, defined as teachers who began teaching within three
years of the survey. The last two columns present estimates averaged over incumbent
teachers, who began teaching four or more years before the survey.
In all cases, the comparison of OLS and IV estimates suggests an upward bias in
the OLS estimates. Whereas the IV estimates generally indicate a negative effect of
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salary increases on average teacher qualifications, the OLS estimates of the relationship
are consistently positive and, except for the fraction of math and science teachers who
majored in their teaching field, are statistically significant. The endogeneity bias
discussed in an earlier section may explain the upward bias. The positive OLS
coefficients on log salary suggests that higher salaries are associated with better-qualified
teachers, but do not necessarily imply a causal effect of salary on qualifications since
salaries and qualifications may simultaneously influence one another. The OLS estimates
may be interpreted as indicating that better-qualified teachers tend to receive higher
salaries from districts, but the IV estimates suggest that-in the short run-higher
salaries do not cause an improvement in teacher qualifications.
1.7.1. Effect on selectivity of undergraduate institution
IV estimates reported in Table 1.8 suggest that increasing teacher salaries leads to
a short-run decrease in the average selectivity of the undergraduate institution attended by
teachers in the district. The magnitude of the estimate is small-a 10 percent salary raise
leads to a decrease of 1.2 units of the selectivity index, compared to a standard deviation
of about 9 units over all teachers-but the estimate is statistically significant. This
negative effect appears to be nearly twice as strong among newly hired teachers as among
incumbent teachers.
A secular decline in this teacher qualification over time may contribute to this
negative result. Figure 1.1 graphs the average selectivity of undergraduate institution
attended for cohorts of teachers based on the year the teacher attained her bachelor's
degree. The regression line shows the predicted values from a regression of selectivity
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on year attained bachelor's degree. There appears to be a slight negative slope to the
estimates, suggesting that average selectivity has decreased slightly over time. In the
short run, the pool of prospective teachers from which districts can hire following a
salary increase may come from less selective undergraduate institutions, driving down the
average among newly hired teachers. If the salary raise increases the retention of better-
qualified incumbent teachers, then one would not expect to see as large of a decline in
qualifications among incumbent teachers.
1.7.2. Effect on average SAT of undergraduate institution
The results presented in Table 1.9 for the average SAT of the undergraduate
institution attended indicate even larger differential effects for newly hired versus
incumbent teachers. While the effect of salaries on this SAT measure averaged over all
teachers in a district is positive but statistically insignificant, the effect averaged over
newly hired teachers is negative and statistically significant. Increasing salaries by 10
percent appears in the short run to decrease the average SAT of colleges attended by
newly hired teachers by 20 points, which is almost a third of a standard deviation.
However, among incumbent teachers with more than four years of teaching experience, a
salary increase seems to exert a positive, albeit smaller, effect, with a 10 percent salary
increase leading to an average increase of about 10 points.
As with the selectivity measure, there is some evidence of a secular decline in
average SAT. Figure 1.2, constructed analogously to Figure 1.1, suggests that the recent
cohorts of teachers come from colleges with slightly lower average SAT scores than
older cohorts of teachers. This secular decline likely affects the average qualifications of
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new hires to some degree, but the decline may not be sufficient to explain the sizable
difference in college quality between newly hired and incumbent teachers as measured by
average SAT.
1.7.3. Effect on fraction of math and science teachers with a major in the teaching field
Raising salaries also appears to decrease the fraction of math and science teachers
in a district who majored in math or science (Table 1.10). Unlike the college selectivity
results, however, this effect appears to be stronger among incumbent teachers than newly
hired teachers. This effect may stem from differential retention of teachers with weaker
qualifications. Previous work has suggested that teachers with science degrees have
more outside opportunities and are less likely than teachers with other degrees to remain
in teaching (see, for example, Murnane et. al. (1991)). If the retention effect of a salary
increase is largest among teachers who majored in subjects other than math and science,
the negative effect on incumbent teachers will result.
1.7.4. Falsification test
Simultaneous determination of the state mandates and the average district
qualifications investigated would undermine my identification strategy. If the decision of
state legislatures to mandate salary increases is influenced by the qualifications of
teachers in the state, then the endogeneity problem that potentially exists at the district
level will persist even when variation in salaries comes from state mandates. The results
reported in Table 1.11 do not show evidence of a systematic relationship between average
district qualifications prior to 1993 and the mandating of pay raises between 1993 and
1999. The estimates are small in magnitude and are not statistically significant.
1.8. Alternative Identification Strategy
The main identification strategy used in this analysis contrasts changes in
teaching salaries and average qualifications between states that did and states that did not
mandate salary increases. While the falsification tests alleviate concerns that the salary
laws were adopted in states experiencing differential preexisting salary trends, one would
ideally like to identify the effects of salary by contrasting changes across districts within
states that mandated salary increases. One strategy for doing so involves interacting the
state-level law dummy with a base-year characteristic of the district and using the
interaction as the instrument for salary.
To implement such a strategy, I interact the law dummy with the base year salary
of the district and estimate the following 2SLS model:
Ln(W)dst = Xdst'ai + a2Ln(Wo)ds + a3(Law*Ln(Wo))dst + Xst + Vdst (4)
Qdst = Xdst'il + 02Ln(Wo)ds+ P3Ln(W)dst + kst + Fdst (5)
where Wo is the salary offered by the district in 1993 and the interaction of the law dummy
with the base-year district salary, Law*Ln(Wo)dst, instruments for log salary in the second
stage.
With the inclusion of state-year effects, Xst, the identification comes from
contrasting changes across districts within in a state generated by the differential salary
effects of the mandate. A main effect of the base year salary is now included, but the
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main effect of the law dummy is absorbed by the state-year dummies. The first-stage
results reported in Table 1.12 indicate that the interaction of the law dummy with the
base-year salary of a district has a statistically significant negative effect on the average
log starting salary offered by a district. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to specifications
including state fixed effects and year effects and are presented for comparison. As
reported in the discussion of the main analysis, the coefficient on the law dummy in
column (1) indicates that districts in states that mandate pay raises increase their salaries
relative to districts in states that do not mandate pay raises. The results in column (2)
produced from including the interaction term and base-year salary indicate that, while
district in states with mandated raises increase their salaries on average, the magnitude of
the increase relates inversely to the base-year salary: the lower the salary in 1993, the
larger the increase in salary between 1993 and 1999.16 This inverse relationship persists
with the inclusion of state-year effects in column (3). The estimates suggest that the
mandates were "more binding"-that is, generated larger percentage increases-in lower
wage districts. 17
Table 1.13 presents the effects of teacher salary on selectivity, average SAT, and
fraction of math and science teachers who majored in their teaching field averaged over
all teachers in a district. The estimates become far less precise after the imposition of the
16 The interaction between the law dummy and the base-year salary has been demeaned to make the main
effect of the law comparable between columns (1) and (2).
17 This differential impact of state mandates on salary increases for districts within state would be
particularly strong in states where the mandates took the form of increasing minimum salaries rather than
raising salaries across-the-board for all teachers; all districts are subject to across-the-board increases, but
minimum increases would not be binding for districts already above the legislated minimum. In future
work, I will examine different types of mandates separately to exploit this potential difference in the
mechanism by which salaries affect qualifications.
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stringent restriction of using only within-state variation, suggesting that there is
insufficient power for the within-state analysis. Furthermore, the use of the interactions
may exacerbate any measurement error that is present.' 8 Nonetheless, the signs of the
coefficients on log salary are negative and do not refute the suggestion from the main
analysis that salary increases lead to decreases in average qualifications in the short run.
The negative effect on the proportion of math and science teachers with a major in their
teaching subject appears to be rather robust, as the estimates remain statistically
significant even in the presence of state-year dummies.
1.9. Conclusions
This paper attempts to assess the causal effect of teacher pay on teacher
qualifications, as measured by the selectivity and average SAT of a teacher's
undergraduate institution and the likelihood that math and science teachers majored in
their teaching field. In particular, I estimate the relationship between teacher salaries
offered by a district and the average qualifications possessed by teachers employed in
that district. I instrument for district-level changes in salaries using state-mandated salary
increases in an attempt to identify the effect of salaries from a plausibly exogenous
source of variation.
18 Since I do not have the full universe of districts, the salaries are drawn from probability samples and are,
consequently, random variables. As a result, a district with a "low draw" from the 1993 salary distribution
will likely have a higher draw in 1999, indicating greater observed growth over the 1993 to 1999 period
even in the absence of a salary mandate. To eliminate this concern that the observed salary growth may be
due to measurement error rather than the causal effect of state mandates, in future work I will instrument
for the initial salary, possibly by using a salary estimate from an alternative data source.
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The results suggest that, in the short run, salary increases tend to decrease the
average qualifications of teachers employed in a given district. On average, teachers
hired after the salary increases graduated from lower quality undergraduate institutions
than incumbent teachers. Pay raises also appear to negatively impact subject matter
expertise in math and science-the fraction of math and science teachers with academic
majors in those fields tends to decline after a salary increase.
Negative short-run effects do not preclude positive long-run effects of salaries on
teacher qualifications. Higher teacher salaries may ultimately induce better-qualified
individuals to enter into and remain in the teaching profession. Yet, potential long-run
benefits notwithstanding, the negative short-run consequences of salaries on teacher
qualifications raise doubts about the efficacy of using general pay raises to improve
teacher quality and student achievement. District hiring practices may be partly
responsible for the negative effects on average qualifications. The results of this analysis
bear out the worst-case scenario proposed by Ballou and Podgursky (1995) and Ballou
(1996), in which across-the-board pay raises lead to a decline in teacher quality due, in
part, to the failure of districts to hire the best-qualified individuals from the pool of
applicants. Inefficiencies in the hiring process may become increasingly detrimental in
the presence of a secular decline in average qualifications, as the qualifications of a
teacher drawn at random declines over time. I also note that the results of this analysis
are in the spirit of earlier findings by Angrist and Guryan (2003), who find that state-
mandated licensing exams are associated with pay raises but no commensurate increase
in teacher qualifications; testing may impose barriers to entry into teaching without
improving quality. Licensing requirements appear to be another aspect of hiring
practices that potentially hinder efforts to raise the quality of the teacher workforce.
Future work will clarify the causal channels affecting the link between teacher
salaries and teacher qualifications. The present analysis used the average effect of state
salary mandates to identify the impact of salaries on qualifications. Most of the mandates
took the form of across-the-board percentage pay raises for all teachers throughout the
state. Other forms of salary mandates that differentially affect districts or teachers may
have different consequences. In the next phase of this research, I will explore separately
the increases in minimum pay levels and other types of salary mandates.
Combining salary increases with incentives to improve hiring processes and
otherwise target well-qualified individuals could potentially raise the average
qualifications of teachers hired and retained. In the absence of such additional policies,
however, the evidence presented here suggests that general pay raises will fail in the short
run to produce the desired improvements in teacher quality.
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Variable
Average Starting Salary a
Selectivity
Average SAT
Fraction Math/Science
Teachers with Major in
Teaching Field
Number of Full-Time
Equivalent Teachers
Enrollment
Fraction Minority Students
Fraction of Students
Approved for Free/Reduced
Price Lunch
Union-Meet and Confer b
Table 1.2. Summary Statistics
Districts in States
Without Salary Mandates
N=1295
Year MeanYear (Standard Deviation)
1993 276561993 (4443)
277171999
(4602)
55.81993 (8.64)
56.119999.01) (9.0 1)
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
919
(62.5)
918
(63.1)
.466
(.407)
.512
(.429)
331
(1462)
379
(1751)
5950
(27590)
6201
(28622)
.194
(.250)
.208
(.266)
.397
(.309)
.315
(.231)
.102
(.303)
.070
(.255)
.833 .2631993
Union-Collective (.373) (.440)
Bargaining C 1999 .847 .247
(.360) (.431)
a Salaries are converted to 1999 dollars using the CPI-U.
b Union-Meet and Confer is a dummy variable that equals one if the district has a meet and confer
agreement with a teacher's union and zero otherwise.
C Union-Collective Bargaining is a dummy variable that equals one if the district has a collective
bargaining agreement with a teacher's union and zero otherwise.
Districts in States
With Salary Mandates
N = 919
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
24649
(2784)
26254
(2782)
52.2
(9.40)
51.3
(9.78)
872
(70.1)
868
(72.6)
.415
(.398)
.384
(.405)
417
(820)
483
(968)
6929
(13503)
7150
(13917)
.254
(.279)
.289
(.299)
.507
(.289)
.435
(.223)
.098
(.297)
.089
(.284)
Table 1.3. First-Stage Estimates with State and Year Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable
Ln(Average Ln(Salary for Ln(Salary for Ln(Salary for
Starting Salary) B.A., M.A., M.A.,
0 Experience) 0 Experience) 20 Yrs
Experience)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Law
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemp. Rate
Union-Meet
Union-Coll Bargain
Observations
R-squared
0.070
(0.014)
0.021
(0.003)
0.065
(0.010)
-0.032
(0.008)
-0.016
(0.005)
0.008
(0.011)
-0.014
(0.009)
4382
0.76
0.069
(0.013)
0.019
(0.003)
0.058
(0.009)
-0.029
(0.008)
-0.014
(0.005)
0.009
(0.010)
-0.013
(0.009)
4382
0.77
0.072
(0.014)
0.023
(0.003)
0.071
(0.011)
-0.034
(0.009)
-0.017
(0.005)
0.007
(0.012)
-0.015
(0.009)
4382
0.74
0.058
(0.011)
0.034
(0.005)
0.070
(0.016)
-0.059
(0.014)
-0.016
(0.005)
0.033
(0.019)
0.026
(0.015)
4382
0.79
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.4. Effect of Law on State Funding
Law
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemployment Rate
Union-Meet and Confer
Union-Collective Bargaining
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable
Ln(Transfer) Ln(Per Pupil Transfer)
(1) (2)
0.133 0.140
(0.063) (0.063)
0.001
(0.002)
0.024 0.025
(0.019) (0.019)
-0.049 -0.053
(0.042) (0.042)
0.079 0.104
(0.084) (0.084)
-0.001 -0.003
(0.006) (0.005)
0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.006)
4380 4380
0.96 0.92
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.5. Falsification Test: Effect of Law on Salary in Pre-Period
Law
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
State Unemployment Rate
Observations
R-squared
1987-1990
(1)
-0.010
(0.011)
0.016
(0.003)
0.040
(0.011)
0.007
(0.003)
2178
0.76
Dependent Variable: Ln(Salary)
Time Period
1987-1993
(2)
-0.016
(0.017)
0.017
(0.003)
0.042
(0.012)
0.006
(0.004)
2172
0.71
1993-1999
(3)
0.063
(0.013)
0.015
(0.003)
0.045
(0.011)
-0.013
(0.006)
2164
0.74
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.6. Effect of Salary on Employment
Dependent Variable
Ln(Salary)
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemployment Rate
Union-Meet and Confer
Union-Coll. Bargaining
Observations
R-squared
Ln(FTE Teacher
OLS
(1)
0.120
(0.068)
0.894
(0.009)
0.060
(0.023)
0.055
(0.020)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.043
(0.013)
0.021
(0.017)
4382
0.98
Student/Teacher Ratio
OLS IV
(3) (4)
2.866 -8.066
(1.000) (2.745)
s)
IV(2)
0.538
(0.167)
0.886
(0.009)
0.033
(0.025)
0.068
(0.021)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.039
(0.014)
0.027
(0.018)
4382
0.98
-0.190
(0.345)
-1.397
(0.348)
0.177
(0.120)
-0.021
(0.196)
1.089
(0.291)
4382
0.32
0.671
(0.365)
-1.868
(0.391)
0.082
(0.103)
0.171
(0.262)
1.150
(0.320)
4382
0.28
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable
Table 1.7. Effect of Salary on Experience and Teacher Tenure with Current School
Ln(Salary)
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemployment
Rate
Union-Meet and Confer
Union-Coll. Bargaining
Observations
R-squared
Dependent Variable
Years Teaching Experience Years with Current School
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-1.168 -4.241 -1.069 -8.068
(1.459) (4.246) (1.255) (4.403)
0.474 0.539 -0.086 0.060
(0.123) (0.156) (0.116) (0.145)
-0.662 -0.463 -1.662 -1.211
(0.568) (0.647) (0.560) (0.543)
-0.238 -0.331 0.152 -0.060
(0.525) (0.503) (0.485) (0.460)
0.458 0.434 0.415 0.362
(0.184)
-0.406
(0.374)
0.220
(0.415)
4382
0.11
(0.193)
-0.378
(0.386)
0.179
(0.422)
4382
0.11
(0.171)
-0.067
(0.374)
0.519
(0.378)
4382
0.15
(0.176)
-0.003
(0.416)
0.425
(0.386)
4382
0.13
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.8. Effect of Salary on Selectivity of Undergraduate Institution
Dependent Variable: Selectivity of Undergraduate Institution
Ln(Salary)
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemployment Rate
Union-Meet and Confer
Union-Coll. Bargaining
Observations
R-sauared
Average over all teachers
OLS(1)
4.837
(1.963)
0.004
(0.148)
-1.999
(1.065)
-1.115
(0.625)
-0.138
(0.183)
0.054
(0.686)
-0.146
(0.636)
4370
0.36
IV
(2)
-12.333
(5.159)
0.360
(0.177)
-0.870
(1.134)
-1.644
(0.599)
-0.263
(0.171)
0.214
(0.695)
-0.382
(0.640)
4370
0.35
Average over new hires
OLS IV
(3) (4)
5.671 -21.442
(3.888) (8.303)
-0.052 0.568
(0.273) (0.333)
-0.104 1.480
(1.407) (1.427)
-2.681 -3.078
(1.092) (1.059)
0.089 -0.059
(0.324) (0.297)
1.406 1.657
(0.966) (1.028)
1.021 0.482
(1.164) (1.110)
3008 3008
0.23 0.20
Average over incumbents
OLS IV
(5) (6)
5.367 -11.499
(1.901) (5.787)
0.159 0.508
(0.189) (0.232)
-2.224 -1.140
(1.138) (1.202)
-1.047 -1.583
(0.718) (0.696)
-0.320 -0.435
(0.205) (0.200)
-0.542 -0.387
(0.811) (0.812)
-0.316 -0.554
(0.689) (0.707)
4345 4345
0.34 0.32
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable: Selectivity of Undergraduate Institution
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Table 1.10. Effect of Salary on Fraction of Math and Science Teachers who Majored in Their Field
Dependent Variable: Fraction with Major in Main Field (Math/Science)
Average over all teachers
OLS IV
(1) (2)
Ln(Salary)
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemployment Rate
Union-Meet and Confer
Union-Coll. Bargaining
Observations
R-squared
0.026 -1.079
(0.152) (0.416)
-0.013 0.010
(0.011) (0.014)
0.015 0.082
(0.048) (0.054)
-0.107 -0.142
(0.047) (0.052)
-0.008 -0.014
(0.013) (0.015)
0.057 0.062
(0.031) (0.033)
0.041 0.024
(0.032) (0.032)
3114 3114
0.06 0.02
Average over new hires
OLS
(3)
-0.006
(0.240)
0.010
(0.018)
0.078
(0.086)
0.034
(0.094)
-0.015
(0.020)
0.039
(0.070)
-0.023
(0.091)
1133
0.08
IV
(4)
-0.736
(0.798)
0.022
(0.023)
0.122
(0.093)
0.018
(0.092)
-0.021
(0.022)
0.046
(0.073)
-0.019
(0.096)
1133
0.06
Average over incumbents
OLS IV
(5) (6)
0.062 -0.977
(0.156) (0.433)
-0.019 0.003
(0.012) (0.016)
0.013 0.078
(0.050) (0.056)
-0.122
(0.047)
-0.001
(0.015)
0.051
(0.035)
0.043
(0.036)
2926
0.06
-0.155
(0.053)
-0.007
(0.016)
0.054
(0.035)
0.024
(0.036)
2926
0.03
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.11. Falsification Test: Effect of Law on Average Qualifications in Pre-Period
Selectivity
(1)
Law
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
State Unemployment Rate
Observations
R-squared
0.003
(0.426)
-0.002
(0.249)
-3.736
(1.025)
-0.006
(0.099)
2172
0.43
Dependent Variable
Average SAT(2)
0.834
(3.564)
4.011
(1.692)
-58.735
(10.095)
-1.042
(0.718)
2172
0.55
Major in Main(3)
-0.029(0.035)
0.004
(0.012)
0.024
(0.060)
0.004(0.009)
1545
0.07
Regressions include state fixed effects, year effects, and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.12. First Stage Estimates with Various Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: Ln(Salary)
Law
Law* 1993Ln(Sallary)
Law
(1)
0.070
(0.014)
1993 Ln(Salary)
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemployment Rate
Union-Meet and Confer
Union-Collective Bargaining
State Fixed Effects?
Year Effects?
State*Year Effects?
Observations
R-squared
0.021
(0.003)
0.065
(0.010)
-0.032
(0.008)
-0.016
(0.005)
0.008
(0.011)
-0.014
(0.009)
Yes
Yes
No
4382
0.76
Instruments
Law, Law*93LnSal
(2)
0.069
(0.012)
-0.290
(0.039)
0.881
(0.026)
0.003
(0.001)
0.012
(0.005)
-0.006
(0.003)
-0.016
(0.005)
0.005
(0.003)
0.005
(0.004)
Yes
Yes
No
4382
0.91
Law*93LnSal
(3)
-0.261
(0.039)
0.877
(0.026)
0.003
(0.001)
0.012
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
No
No
Yes
4382
0.93
Regressions include metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.13. IV Estimates of Effect of Salary on Teacher Qualifications with State-Year Dummies
Ln(Salary)
Ln(Enrollment)
Fraction Minority
Fraction Lunch
State Unemployment
Rate
Union-Meet and Confer
Union-Coll. Bargaining
Observations
R-squared
Selectivity
(1)
-6.393
(25.590)
13.674
(21.793)
-0.070
(0.155)
-2.235
(1.113)
-1.068
(0.694)
0.128
(0.714)
0.002
(0.677)
4370
0.37
Dependent Variable
Average SAT(2)
-11.855
(146.839)
55.196
(122.758)
2.690
(1.178)
-35.021
(6.971)
-23.526
(5.236)
-2.783
(4.358)
-3.312
(4.279)
4374
0.51
Major in Teaching Field(3)
-2.554
(1.124)
2.214
(0.873)
-0.011
(0.012)
0.035
(0.050)
-0.118
(0.048)
0.045
(0.033)
0.040
(0.033)
3114
0.03
Regressions include state-year dummies and metropolitan status dummies.
Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in parentheses.
Figure 1.1. Average Selectivity of Undergraduate Institution by Year Attained Bachelor's Degree
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Chapter Two
The Effect of State-Mandated Salary Increases on Teacher Exit
2.1. Introduction
Calls for widespread pay raises as a means of improving the quality of the teacher
workforce have been made and debated for decades. As fears of overall teacher
shortages wax and wane with enrollment projections, one of the persistent motivations
for such calls continues to be a desire to improve student achievement by stemming the
exit of highly qualified teachers. The need to recruit and retain well-qualified teachers
with training in technical fields often garners special attention amid concerns over student
performance in mathematics and science and potential shortages in these areas. Some
stakeholders in the debate argue for higher teacher pay as a means of increasing the
attractiveness of the profession, thereby inducing highly qualified individuals to remain
in teaching. Others doubt the efficacy of such general pay increases and advocate instead
for more targeted raises or other strategies that feature differentiated compensation.
One of the few generally agreed points in discussions about improving the quality
of the teacher workforce concerns subject matter expertise. In order to teacher well, the
argument goes, teachers need to know well what they teach. In mandating highly
qualified teachers as part of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act, the federal government
included demonstrated subject matter competence in its definition of highly qualified:
newly hired elementary school teachers must pass a test covering subject matter
knowledge and teaching skills in areas of the basic elementary school curriculum, while
newly hired middle or high school teachers must demonstrate "a high level of
competency" in each academic subject they teach by either passing an academic subject
test or completing an academic major, coursework equivalent to an undergraduate
academic major, a graduate degree, or another advanced credential. Key players in the
education arena have endorsed requiring teachers to major in an academic discipline-as
opposed to education-as a step towards ensuring that teachers possess adequate content
knowledge. In issuing their recommendations for improving teacher preparation and
quality, the American Federation of Teachers (2003) recently urged colleges and
universities to require an academic major for prospective teachers. A coalition of
business leaders, educators, and governors similarly endorsed an academic major
requirement for teachers in their recommendations (Koppich 2001), calling for an end to
the education major.
The importance of expertise in the subject area taught may be heightened at the
secondary school level, where students learn advanced concepts in departmentalized
courses. Furthermore, higher attrition of teachers with academic degrees
disproportionately affects secondary schools due to the larger proportion of teachers with
academic degrees. For example, in the sample used in this analysis, secondary teachers
are evenly split across degree type-49 percent have an academic degree and 51 percent
have an education degree-whereas the majority of elementary teachers (76 percent)
have an education degree.
To date, little empirical evidence exists on the efficacy of general pay raises as a
means of improving teacher quality. Much has been written about the general
relationship between teacher compensation and teacher recruitment or retention, but few
studies investigate the consequences of widespread salary increases. Figlio (2002), for
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example, finds evidence suggesting that unilaterally raising salaries relative to other
districts in the same county can improve the quality of teachers a nonunion school district
hires, as measured by college selectivity and subject matter expertise; but, he notes that
the finding does not address the question of whether pay raises spread across a large
number of schools would improve teacher quality. The author of a recent report issued
by the Education Commission of the States concludes from his review of the literature
that existing research provides no guidance on the effects of across-the-board salary
increases (Allen 2005).
This paper aims to provide evidence on how widespread salary increases affect
teacher retention by exploiting variations in salary produced by state-mandated pay
raises. In particular, I use data from the 1993-94 and 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing
Surveys and the corresponding Teacher Follow-up Surveys to estimate the impact of
state-mandated pay raises on the probability of a teacher exiting the state public school
system. In addition to exploring the overall relationship between widespread pay raises
and the likelihood of teacher exit, these rich datasets permit an investigation of whether
the sensitivity of the exit decision to the pay raise varies with teacher qualifications such
as years of teaching experience and subject matter expertise, as measured by the type of
degree held.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background for
thinking about the effects of pay raises on the teacher exit decision. I then describe the
data and the sample studied. After explaining the empirical strategy, I present the results
of analyses estimating the impact of mandated pay raises on teacher exit decisions. The
final section concludes.
2.2. Background
As originally argued by Kershaw and McKean (1962), the failure of the public
school salary schedule to adjust for differences in opportunity costs may explain the
relatively high rates of attrition among teachers with specific subject matter expertise,
technical skills, or other widely valued qualifications. The vast majority of public school
districts pay teachers according to salary scales that depend solely on the teacher's
educational attainment, as measured by highest degree earned or number of graduate
credits accumulated, and years of experience. Whereas a second year teacher with a
bachelor's degree in, say, physics, likely would command a much higher salary outside of
the teaching profession than a second year teacher with a bachelor's degree in elementary
education, both individuals would receive the same salary as teachers in a given public
school district. The lure of higher salaries outside of teaching may eventually entice the
teacher with the physics degree to leave the profession. More generally, teachers
possessing subject matter expertise in lucrative fields or any other qualification rewarded
more highly outside of teaching may face relatively high opportunity costs and choose to
leave the profession. Such an opportunity cost argument may help explain the finding of
Henke et al (2001) that beginning teachers who majored in engineering, mathematics, or
natural science are more likely to exit the profession than teachers who majored in
education. 19
19 Similarly, several studies investigating variation in exit rates by subject taught find higher rates of
attrition among secondary teachers who teach specific subjects than among elementary teachers, with
attrition rates being highest among science teachers (see, for example, Grissmer and Kirby (1992) and
Mumrnane et al (1991)).
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An analysis of SAT scores for prospective teachers offers evidence consistent
with the notion that teachers with degrees in math and science or other academic fields
may have better outside opportunities than teachers with degrees in education. Gitomer
et al (1999) analyze data on individuals who took the Praxis II tests used in many states
as a requirement for teacher licensure. Specifically, they examine the SAT scores of all
Praxis II test takers in 1994-1997 for whom SAT scores were available. For any given
area of licensure, they find individuals with academic majors tend to have higher SAT
scores on average than individuals who majored in education. Furthermore, when
comparing scores across licensure areas, individuals with math and science majors have
the highest mean scores. For example, math majors seeking licensure in math have a
mean SAT score of 1152. The mean score for this group exceeds both the mean SAT
score of education majors seeking math licensure (1105) as well as the mean score of
social studies majors seeking licensure in social studies (1088). Since the data include all
Praxis II test takers, regardless of whether they ultimately begin teaching, these findings
must be viewed as at best suggestive of the relationship between major and test score
among individuals who actually enter teaching. Still, to the extent that higher SAT scores
indicate higher academic ability and academic ability is valued by all employers, these
general patterns support the notion that teachers with academic degrees-especially those
who major in math or science-have greater outside opportunities.
While raising teacher salaries potentially decreases the likelihood of exit by
making teaching relatively more attractive, the effect on the quality composition of the
teacher workforce depends partly on whether and how the sensitivity of the exit decision
to salary varies across teacher qualifications. If a pay raise reduces the likelihood of exit
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of better-qualified and less-qualified teachers by similar magnitudes, then the salary
change increases retention without affecting quality; schools may experience some
benefit from not having to incur the costs of hiring as many new teachers as before the
raise, but the raise does not increase the proportion of highly-qualified teachers. As
hypothesized by Murnane and Olsen (1990), the effect of a salary increase on the
likelihood of exit may depend on the teacher's opportunity cost, but whether a higher
opportunity cost increases or decreases the retention effect is unclear a priori. If less-
qualified teachers have very low exit probabilities in the absence of salary changes-
perhaps due to limited outside opportunities-a pay raise may not produce a sizable
effect on the retention of these teachers; however, the increase in the relative
attractiveness of teaching may lead some highly-qualified teachers who would have
otherwise exited to remain in the profession. A pay raise would positively affect the
quality composition in this scenario, as better-qualified teachers are more sensitive to the
salary increase. Alternatively, a negative effect on the quality composition could arise if
less-qualified teachers respond more strongly than better-qualified teachers. Pay raises of
the magnitude implemented in practice may not be sufficient to entice highly-qualified
teachers to continue forgoing lucrative outside options, but may be large enough to
induce less-qualified teachers with lower opportunity costs to remain in teaching. Which
scenario will arise in the presence of a widespread pay raise is an empirical question.
A relatively small number of studies have explored this question of whether and
how the influence of salary on the likelihood of exiting teaching varies with teacher
qualifications. The 1990 Murnane and Olsen study of the effect of salary and opportunity
costs on the length of stay in teaching for North Carolina teachers examines the
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interaction between salary and scores on a standardized test. They find a stronger
influence of salary among lower-scoring teachers; in particular, the impact of salary on
length of stay in teaching is approximately 30 percent less for teachers who scored in the
top quartile than for teachers with lower scores. In contrast, Podgursky, Monroe, and
Watson (2004) find in their analysis of the exit decision of Missouri teachers that the
interaction between salary and a teacher's ACT score is statistically insignificant. The
few papers that specifically investigate the effects of widespread pay raises on the
qualifications of the teacher workforce make predictions primarily based on simulations.
Ballou and Podgursky (1995) simulate the effects of a 20 percent teacher pay raise under
various scenarios and conclude that an across-the-board pay raise produces at best a
moderate improvement in the average SAT score of the teacher workforce and at worst a
modest decline in the average. Stinebrickner (2001) simulates the impact of two different
wage increases: one in which all teachers received a 25 percent pay raise and one in
which the average wage increases by 25 percent, but the raise received by a given teacher
depends linearly on the teacher's SAT score. His simulations suggest that both policies
increase the amount of time individuals certified as teachers spend teaching by both
increasing the proportion choosing to teach and decreasing the likelihood of exit among
teachers. Both policies also increased the labor supply of individuals with high SAT
scores relative to lower-scoring individuals, although the increase in the proportion of
high scorers is higher under the policy that bases the pay raise on SAT score. Manksi
(1987) similarly finds that a substantial pay raise could generate an increase in the
average SAT score of the teacher workforce-a 40 percent across the board pay raise
would raise the average SAT score in his data from 950 to 972-but that combining a pay
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raise with a minimum SAT requirement could achieve a large increase in the average
SAT of the wcorkforce with a smaller percentage raise. Such simulations can yield useful
insights, but do not provide strong evidence regarding how widespread pay raises affect
teacher quality in practice.
This paper seeks to provide new empirical evidence on the how the retention
effects of general pay raises impact the quality of the teacher workforce. Instead of
simulating the effects of policy changes, I exploit actual state-mandated pay raises passed
during the 1990s. Utilizing a national dataset that identifies the status of a teacher one
year after the initial survey year enables me to estimate the average effect of salary
mandates on the likelihood of exit and to explore whether the effect varies with the
subject matter expertise of the teacher.
2.3. Empirical Strategy
This paper uses a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the effect of state-
mandated pay raises on the exit decisions of teachers. Nineteen state legislatures
mandated pay raises for public school teachers between 1993 and 1999, thereby
compelling all districts within the state to raise their salaries by a specified amount or
percentage. I estimate the reduced-form effect of the pay raises on the probability of a
teacher exiting the state school system as the change over time in the average difference
in probability of exit between teachers located in states that mandated pay raises and
teachers located in states that did not pass such mandates. Stated in a regression
framework, I estimate the following model.
Exitijst = Xijst'l + •2 Lawst + 6s + yt +- Eijst (1)
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The dependent variable Exitijst equals one if teacher i, who taught in public school j in
state s at time t, exited the state public school system at time t+1 and equals zero
otherwise. Lawst is a time-varying dummy variable: in 1993, the variable equals zero for
all states; in 1999, the variable equals one if the state mandated a teacher salary increase
during the period studied and zero otherwise. The coefficient on Lawst, ,82, is the key
parameter of interest; the estimate of 32 represents the effect of the salary mandate,
capturing the difference over time between exit probabilities of teachers in states that
passed mandates and teachers in states that did not. Xyst is a vector of teacher, school,
and state characteristics that potentially affect the demand for teachers and the likelihood
of teachers exiting the school system. The state fixed effects, 6s, control for time-
invariant characteristics of the states, and the year effect, 7yt, captures time shocks
common across all states. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I estimate
equation (1) using a probit model.
In addition to estimating the model over all teachers, I also compute estimates
separately for subgroups of teachers to allow for differences that may lead to variation in
sensitivity to the salary mandate across groups. To explore differences based on subject
matter expertise, I first split teachers into two categories defined by whether they have a
degree in an academic discipline or a degree in education. Many teachers in the sample
have more than one undergraduate major field of study or earned a degree beyond the
bachelor's degree. I place a teacher in the education degree category if all of her majors
fall into the education fields, which include general education (e.g., elementary
education), subject area education (e.g., science education), special education (e.g.,
speech/language impaired), or other education (e.g., curriculum and instruction). If any
54
of the major fields of study for her bachelor's, master's, doctorate, or professional
degrees occurred in a discipline outside of the education fields, I define the teacher as
having an academic degree. I further categorize teachers with academic degrees to
distinguish between those with degrees in mathematics or science and those with
academic degrees in other fields. As experience has been found to be another important
dimension of teacher quality (see e.g., Rivkin, Kain, and Hanushek 2005), I also report
results separately by teacher experience level. New teachers are defined as those teachers
who began teaching within three years of the Schools and Staffing Survey. Experienced
teachers began teaching four or more years before the survey.
2.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) combined with the corresponding
Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS) provide detailed data on teacher attrition and individual
characteristics for a nationally representative sample of teachers. Each round of the
SASS collects information from districts, schools, administrators, and teachers.
Conducted in the school year following the SASS, the TFS surveys a subset of the SASS
teachers to obtain follow-up information. This analysis uses two rounds of these surveys:
the 1993-94 SASS with the 1994-95 TFS and the 1999-2000 SASS with the 2000-01
TFS. School and district characteristics including enrollment, fraction minority students,
fraction of students approved for free or reduced-price lunch, union status, and urbanicity
come from the SASS school and district records. The SASS teacher record contains a
variety of teacher characteristics including major field for each degree earned, years of
teaching experience, age, sex, and race/ethnicity. From the TFS record, I ascertain details
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about the employment status of the teacher one year after the SASS school year. The
data include not only information on whether the SASS teacher remained in the teaching
profession, but also details about the nature of any teaching transitions that may have
occurred and the employment status of the individual if she is no longer teaching. The
TFS also reports the respondent's marital status and number of dependent children under
the age of five. In addition to the SASS and TFS data, I use state unemployment rates
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics as a control for prevailing labor market conditions.
The analysis sample consists of teachers included in the TFS who worked full-
time in regular public elementary and secondary schools at the time of the corresponding
SASS and who have complete school and district records. Forty-five teachers who
reported not having a bachelor's degree were dropped from the analysis. The final
sample contains 5,658 teachers.
Data on the pay raises mandated by nineteen states between 1993 and 1999 come
primarily from "Legislative Update," an Education Week feature that includes summaries
of education-related bills enacted by state legislatures. I searched the updates and
compiled bills related to teacher pay for the years studied. In an effort to improve the
accuracy of the data, I read state education statues to ascertain additional details
regarding the salary mandates. I also supplemented the salary information with reports
produced by the Southern Regional Education Board. Many of the pay raises took the
form of across-the-board percentage increases; in a few instances, the pay raises
depended on the education and experience level of the teacher or on the wealth of the
district.20
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for a variety of teacher and district
characteristics thought to affect the teacher exit decision. The table presents statistics
separately for teachers in states that did and states that did not pass salary mandates.
Most of the characteristics are broadly similar for the two groups of teachers. Including
these characteristics as covariates in the analysis helps to control for systematic
differences in observable characteristics between the groups.
Variation in exit rates by field and experience
Consistent with previous literature (e.g., Henke et al. 2001), the exit rates reported
in Table 2.2 suggest that teachers in the sample with academic degrees tended to exit at
higher rates than teachers with education degrees. Among teachers with academic
degrees, teachers who majored in math or science exited at a higher rate than teachers
who majored in other fields. The table also illustrates differences by experience level,
with new teachers exiting at higher rates than experienced teachers.
Variation in salaries by field and experience
Table 2.3 presents the results of regressing log base salary on years of experience,
dummies for education and degree type, and other characteristics. The estimates reflect
the salient features of the typical public school salary schedule, which rewards teaching
20 For more details on the mandates and the varied factors influencing their passage, see chapter one of this
thesis.
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experience and educational attainment-salary increases by about 3 percent with each
year of experience and jumps by nearly 9 percent for teachers who earn a master's degree
or higher. However, the estimates also provide evidence of a wage premium for teachers
with math or science degrees. In the full sample, teachers with math or science degrees
earn, on average, about 2 percent more than teachers with education degrees. The
premium appears to be higher among secondary school teachers-at the secondary level,
teachers with math or science degrees earn 3.7 percent more than those with education
degrees. There is also some evidence of a relatively small premium for teachers with
academic degrees in fields other than math and science relative to teachers with education
degrees, but the estimates are imprecise.
Thus, although salaries as specified in district salary schedules typically vary only
with educational attainment and years of teaching experience, analyzing the actual base
salaries paid to individual teachers suggests teachers with math and science degrees earn
slightly higher salaries than teachers with education degrees. Previous research similarly
found evidence of differences in earnings by field. Horn and McGuire (1984) compare
official salary schedules to actual salaries observed among secondary school teachers and
find that, while experience and educational attainment dominate as determinants of
salary, teaching field and other teacher attributes also contribute to observed earnings.
Using the 1990-91 SASS, Chambers (1996) similarly finds that teachers who majored in
mathematics earned about 2 percent more than teachers who majored in general
elementary education.
2.5. Effect of State Mandates on Teacher Salaries
The estimates presented in Table 2.4 suggest that the state-mandated pay raises
had the intended effect of increasing teacher salaries. 2 1 On average, teachers in states that
mandated salary increases earned nearly 7 percent more in base salary than teachers
located in states that did not mandate pay raises (column 1). This result holds for both
the full sample and the subsample of secondary school teachers.
Comparing the estimates across subgroups of teachers reveals that the average
effect of the mandate on pay varied with teacher experience level and degree type.
Among teachers with academic degrees as well as secondary school teachers as a whole,
the passage of a mandate tended to raise salaries more for experienced teachers than for
new teachers. Teachers with academic degrees tended to receive larger salary increases
in response to the mandates than teachers with education degrees, particularly at the
secondary level. To further explore differences by degree type, columns 10 and 11 of
Table 2.4 present estimates by the field category of the academic degree-math and
science or an academic degree in a field other than math or science. 22 The estimates
suggest the mandate had the largest effect on the salaries of secondary teachers with
math/science degrees-for this group, salaries increased by about 11 percent in mandate
states relative to non-mandate states.
While the majority of the results reported in Table 2.4 are statistically significant,
several of the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Specifically, estimates for new
21 These results were obtained by ordinary least squares estimation of a model analogous to equation (1)
with log base teacher salary as the dependent variable.
22 The small samples sizes and limited power preclude obtaining meaningful estimates by experience level
within degree field.
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secondary teachers with education degrees, teachers in the full sample with math/science
degrees, and secondary school teachers with academic degrees in fields other than math
or science are not statistically significant. The positive signs and magnitudes of these
coefficients suggest that the mandates raised salaries for these subgroups of teachers, but
the standard errors are relatively large. As the interpretation of the effect of the mandate
on the likelihood of teacher exit depends on the first-stage relationship between the
passage of a mandate and teacher salaries, the next section will present results only for
those subgroups for which a significant first stage exists.
2.6. Effect of State Mandates on Probability of Exit
For the full sample of teachers, there is some evidence that the passage of a state
salary mandate increases teacher retention, but the results are not consistent across groups
of teachers (Table 2.5). Among experienced teachers with education degrees, the
mandates appear to reduce the likelihood of exit by 2.3 percentage points. The estimates
for teachers with academic degrees are also negative, but are smaller in magnitude and
statistically insignificant.
The results for new teachers are somewhat puzzling. Although the first stage
estimates from Table 2.4 indicate that state salary mandates led to a nearly 10 percent
increase in pay for this group, the marginally significant estimates in Table 2.5 (column
8) suggest that the mandates are associated with a relatively large rise in the probability
of teachers exiting the state school system. The results may reflect endogeneity bias. If
states passed mandates in response to high exit rates among new teachers, the estimates
might reflect a relatively high exit rate of these teachers in mandate states rather than a
causal effect of salary mandates. I explore this possibility using a falsification test below.
The results estimated in the subsample of secondary school teachers provide
stronger evidence of a retention effect of widespread pay raises. Among these teachers,
the marginal effect of the mandate is to decrease the probability of exit by about 3
percentage points. As with the full sample, the responsiveness of secondary teachers to
the mandates varies across subgroups. The effects appear to be stronger among
experienced teachers than new teachers. Considering the effects by degree type, the
results suggest a significant decrease in the likelihood of exit for teachers with academic
degrees-the mandates appear to lower the probability of an experienced secondary
school teacher with an academic degree exiting the state public school system by 3.4
percentage points. A similar finding emerges for secondary school teachers with
academic degrees specifically in math or science (column 10), although the estimated
effect is only marginally significant. The smaller magnitude of the marginal effect
suggests a weaker responsiveness among secondary school teachers with education
degrees than those with academic degrees, though the estimates for education-degree
holders are imprecise.
Interpreting the results in terms of responsiveness to salary requires considering
the reduced-form estimates of the effects of the mandates on the probability of exit (Table
2.5) in light of the first-stage estimates of the effects of the mandates on salary presented
earlier (Table 12.4). Among experienced secondary school teachers, salaries for those
with academic degrees increased by 9.5 percent on average compared to a 5.8 percent
increase for those with education degrees. The finding of a stronger retention effect of
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the mandates on experienced secondary school teachers holding academic degrees may
reflect this larger salary increase rather than a greater sensitivity of their exit behavior to
salaries. However, the elasticities implied by the first-stage and reduced-form estimates
indicate that experienced secondary teachers with academic degrees are, in fact, highly
sensitive to salary, with an elasticity with respect to salary of -4.4. The estimates for
experienced secondary teachers with education degrees are imprecise, but it is worth
noting that the implied elasticity for this group is -3.7. Table 2.4 also indicates that
teachers with academic degrees specifically in math or science experienced the largest
salary increase in response to the mandates. The implied elasticity of -3.0 for
math/science degree-holders suggests that this group of teachers is sensitive to salary in
deciding whether or not to exit, but to a lesser extent than teachers with other types of
degrees.
Interaction Between Salary Mandate and Union Status
Previous work suggests that unionization affects the structure of teacher
compensation. Holmes (1979), for example, finds that differences in earnings across
groups of teachers tend to decline as union activity increases. Zwerling and Thomason
(1995) present evidence that collective bargaining and increased union density
significantly raise the salaries of teachers at the high end of the salary scale but have little
or no effect on salaries at the low end, evidence which they interpret as supportive of the
hypothesis that collective bargaining tends to reorient the teacher salary structure to favor
the median teacher rather than the marginal teacher. Given previous evidence of union
effects on teacher pay, it is plausible that the effect of salary mandates on salaries and
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ultimately on teacher exit differs between union and nonunion school districts. I explore
this possibility by adding to the main specifications an interaction between the law
dummy and an indicator for district union status.23 Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the results.
The first-stage estimates presented in Table 2.6 suggest that unions tend to
depress the effect of the mandates on salaries. In nonunion districts, the mandates are
associated with higher salaries, raising salaries by 7.6 percent on average in the full
sample of teachers and 9.3 percent on average among secondary school teachers. The
negative coefficients on most of the interaction terms indicate that the increase in salary
associated with mandates is smaller for teachers in union districts than for those in
nonunion districts. Particularly among secondary teachers, the negative interaction
effects tend to offset the main effects of the law dummy, implying that the mandates have
effectively zeron--or, in some instances, a slightly negative-effect on teacher salaries in
union districts.
Given the first-stage results, the reduced-form estimates shown in Table 2.7
present a puzzling picture of the influence of unions on the effect of the salary mandates
on teacher exit. The results for nonunion school districts, particularly at the secondary
school level, suggest that the exit behavior of experienced teachers with academic
degrees is sensitive to the salary mandate but the exit behavior of experienced teachers
with education degrees is not. For experienced secondary school teachers with academic
degrees in nonunion school districts, the mandates appear to produce a nearly 10 percent
23 The union dununmy equals one if the district has either a collective bargaining or a meet-and-confer
agreement with a teachers' union and equals zero if the district has no agreement. Among districts in the
sample that have any union agreement (71% of the sample), the vast majority (91%) have a collective
bargaining agreement.
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increase in pay and lead to a 4 percentage point decrease in the probability of exit. Yet,
in spite of a similar pay increase, the marginal effect of the mandates on experienced
secondary school teachers with education degrees in nonunion districts is a statistically
insignificant .006. In union districts, on the other hand, experienced teachers with
education degrees exhibit the greatest reduction in the likelihood of exit. Among
experienced teachers in union districts, first-stage estimates suggest larger salary gains
for teachers with academic degrees than for those with education degrees, yet the
retention effects of the mandate appear to be smaller for teachers with academic degrees.
While I do not have a compelling explanation for these results, I note that they are
broadly consistent with previous findings by Hoxby (1996) and Figlio (2002). Hoxby
finds that unions have a positive effect on teacher salaries and other school inputs yet
have a negative effect on student achievement. To the extent that teacher subject matter
expertise and college selectivity affect student achievement, Figlio's results may help
explain this relationship-he finds a significant positive relationship between a higher
salaries and the probability of hiring teachers with these qualifications for nonunion
districts but not for union districts. The results presented here suggest a relationship on
the retention side similar to that found by Figlio on the recruitment side. Among
nonunion school districts, higher salaries appear to be associated with greater retention of
teachers with subject matter expertise, as measured by possessing a degree in an
academic field. This relationship weakens in union districts, where stronger retention
effects occur for teachers with education degrees.
2.7. Pre-Period Falsification Test
As a check on the validity of interpreting the results as the effects of the salary
mandates, I compare the main results to results for the pre-period. In particular, I
estimate the model using data from the 1987 SASS with the corresponding 1988 TFS and
the 1993 SASS with the corresponding 1994 TFS. 24 Mandate status is defined as before:
a state is considered a mandate state if its legislature mandated at least one teacher salary
increase between 1993 and 1999. A finding of a similar effect of the mandates during the
1987 to 1993 period would suggest that the retention effects found in the main analysis
are spurious and did not result from the salary mandates. Finding zero effect of the
mandates in the pre-period would support the notion that the mandates drove the
retention effects. Since the 1987-88 round of the SASS did not collect data on district
union status, the test does not include specifications with the law-union interaction.
Overall, the results reported in Table 2.8 are consistent with mandates having a
real retention effect on teachers. The estimated marginal effects in the pre-period tend to
be relatively small in magnitude and are not statistically significant. However, the results
do not completely allay concerns that a systematic relationship between teacher exit prior
to 1993 and the passage of salary mandates between 1993 and 1999 may exist for
particular subgroups. The large positive marginal effect estimated in the main analysis
for new teachers in the full sample with education degrees raised the possibility that
mandates may have passed in states where exit rates for teachers tended to be high.
Though the corresponding estimate for the pre-period is not statistically significant, the
24 Union status and fraction of students approved for free or reduced-price lunch are not available in the
1987-88 round of the SASS.
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magnitude of the positive marginal effect suggests that the possible endogeneity cannot
be ruled out conclusively. The sizable negative marginal effects found for new teachers
with academic degrees also raise concern that the passage of mandates may have been
related to existing teacher exit patterns. Nevertheless, the smaller, statistically
insignificant estimates for teachers overall as well as for the experienced teachers for
whom the main analysis indicated significant retention effects offer support for
attributing the effects to the salary mandates.
Potential Composition Bias
Another threat to the validity of the results arises from the possibility of
composition bias. This paper has analyzed the effect of state salary mandates on the
likelihood of teachers exiting the state school system. Mandates may also impact the
probability of teachers choosing to enter the state school system. If the characteristics of
individuals who choose to teach in the state change in response to the salary mandate, the
observed variation in exit probabilities with the passage of mandates may reflect this
change in the composition of the teacher workforce rather than changes in the exit
decisions of individual teachers. The third chapter of this thesis investigates the influence
of salary mandates and other state characteristics on the choice of teaching state, allowing
any potential effects to depend on several teacher attributes. As the results indicate that
the passage of a mandate does not significantly affect the likelihood of a teacher
beginning her career in a particular state, that analysis suggests that composition effects
do not drive the exit probability results found here.
2.8. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on the retention effects of widespread
teacher pay raises. Exploiting actual salary mandates allows an analysis of the ways in
which an often-proposed strategy for increasing teacher retention affects teacher attrition
in practice. I estimate the effects of the salary mandates by comparing the changes over
time in exit probabilities of teachers who worked in states that mandated pay raises to the
exit probabilities of teachers located in states that did not legislate pay raises.
Overall, the evidence suggests that widespread pay raises increase the retention of
experienced teachers. These retention effects tend to be stronger at the secondary school
level. On average across all secondary school teachers, the state salary mandates studied
appear to have raised teacher pay by about 7 percent and reduced the probability of a
teacher exiting the state school system by about 3 percentage points.
The strength of the retention effect of the pay raises varies with the subject matter
expertise of the teacher, as measured by the type of degree held. Furthermore, the pattern
of the variation across subject matter expertise differs with the union status of the
teacher's district. In nonunion districts, the retention effects are stronger for experienced
teachers with academic degrees than for those with education degrees. Significant effects
also emerge for teachers with academic degrees specifically in the fields of mathematics
or science. hi union districts, however, salary mandates appear to exert the strongest
impact on the exit decisions of experienced teachers with education degrees.
This variation in the responsiveness of teacher exit decisions to the salary
mandates suggests that widespread pay raises are a blunt tool for retaining high quality
teachers. General teacher pay raises will likely induce some teachers to remain in the
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profession, but the effect will depend on the interaction of teacher qualifications and
district characteristics, including experience level, subject matter expertise, and union
status. Though further research is needed to understand the determinants of the union-
nonunion differences and to explore the effects of pay raises on new teachers, this paper
provides support for the notion that injecting the pay system with the flexibility to
account for differences across teachers in sensitivity to salary could represent a critical
component of effective strategies for retaining high quality teachers.
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for Selected Variables
Teachers in States
Without Salary Mandates
N = 3238
Year MeanYear(Standard Deviation)(Standard Deviation) qTeacher Characteristics
Teachers in States
Vith Salary Mandates
N = 2420
Mean
(Standard Deviation)
Exited the State Public
School System
Base Salary a
Academic Degree in
Math/Science
Academic Degree in Other
Fields
Years of Experience
District Characteristics
Enrollment
Fraction Minority Students
Fraction of Students Approved
for Free or Reduced-Price
Lunch
Unio-Collective Bargaining bUnion-Collective Bargaining
Union-Meet and Confer C
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
1993
1999
.061
(.239)
.080
(.272)
42,625
(12,614)
40,653
(12,172)
.081
(.273)
.097
(.295)
.294
(.456)
.325
(.468)
16.0
(9.28)
14.3
(10.4)
4,509
(24,425)
5,209
(28,345)
.176
(.238)
.175
(.245)
.361
(.307)
.297
(.230)
.873
(.333)
.863
(.344)
.057
(.231)
.045
(.208)
.080
(.271)
.088
(.283)
32,197
(6,871)
34,723
(8,152)
.070
(.255)
.065
(.247)
.199
(.399)
.235
(.424)
13.2
(8.70)
14.7
(10.0)
5,603
(13,054)
6,186
(14,214)
.249
(.259)
.251
(.285)
.494
(.279)
.415
(.205)
.207
(.406)
.238
(.426)
.102
(.303)
.059
(.236)
a Salaries are converted to 1999 dollars using the CPI-U.
b Union-Collective Bargaining is a dummy variable that equals one if the district has a collective
bargaining agreement with a teacher's union and zero otherwise.
C Union-Meet and Confer is a dummy variable that equals one if the district has a meet-and-confer
agreement with a teacher's union and zero otherwise.
Variable
Table 2.2. Teacher Exit Rates
Full Sample Secondary Teachers
N % Exit N % Exit
All Teachers 5658 7.6 3265 7.9
Experience Level
New 1868 10.8 1055 11.1
Experienced 3790 6.9 2210 7.3
Degree Type
Academic 2196 8.2 1618 9.4
Math/Science 554 9.6 501 10.3
Other Academic 1642 7.8 1117 9.0
Education 3462 7.3 1647 6.6
Degree Type by
Experience Level
Academic, New 830 11.8 585 14.4
Academic, Experienced 1366 7.1 1033 8.1
Education, New 1038 10.0 470 6.7
Education, Experienced 2424 6.9 1177 6.6
Notes: N is an unweighted count of the number of teachers in each group.
The reported percentages are the weighted percentages of teachers in each
group who exit the state public school system within one year of the SASS
round in which they are surveyed.
Table 2.3. Salary Regressions with Dummies for Degree Type
No Degree Dummi
(1)
Years of Experience
Master's Degree or Higher
Academic Degree
Math/Science Degree
Academic but not Math/Sci
Deg
N
Years of Experience
Master's Degree or Higher
Academic Degree
Math/Science Degree
Academic but not Math/Sci
Deg
N
0.030
(0.002)
0.088
(0.007)
Dependent Variable: Ln (Salary)
Academic Degree
Dummy
(2)
Full Sample
0.031
(0.002)
0.087(0.007)
0.009(0.007)
Academic Field
Dummies
(3)
0.031
(0.002)
0.087
(0.007)
0.022
(0.013)
0.005
(0.008)
5658
0.030
(0.002)
0.103
(0.009)
Secondary Teachers
0.030
(0.002)
0.099
(0.009)
0.022
(0.009)
0.030
(0.002)
0.099
(0.009)
0.037
(0.013)
0.016
(0.010)
3265
Notes: The omitted degree category is education degree. Additional controls include years of experience
squared; a quadratic in age; indicators for black, male, not married, and having dependent children under
the age of five; log district enrollment; district fraction minority students; district fraction of students
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch; an indicator for a district having a collective bargaining or meet-
and-confer agreement with a union; metropolitan status dummies; state unemployment rate; state fixed
effects; and a year effect. Standard errors adjusted for correlation within state-year are reported in
parentheses.
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Chapter Three
How do state characteristics impact the teacher location decision?
Evidence from a conditional logit model
3.1. Introduction
The difficulties school systems face in recruiting well-qualified teachers has been
the subject of much policy discussion for decades. States often devote resources to
recruiting across state lines in an effort to attract teachers, especially recent college
graduates. Articles from newspapers in various parts of the country report anecdotes of
out-of-state recruitment efforts as states attempt to lure teachers away from one another.
At one University of Nebraska-Lincoln teacher recruiting event, for example, districts
from outside the state outnumbered Nebraska districts (O'Connor 2000). A state-funded
teacher recruitment program in California known as CalTeach extended its search for
teachers into thirty states using advertising slogans such as "Left coast. Right job." and
"The opportunities in California for K-12 teachers are as golden as our sunset" (Mitchell
2002; Okoben 2001). Worried about the potential loss of teachers, school leaders in other
states such as Colorado have adjusted their own recruitment efforts in response to
competition firom other states (Mitchell 2002).
In addition to advertising throughout the country, some states try to lure teachers
by offering financial incentives. Widespread pay raises persistently arise as a proposed
strategy for attracting teachers from other states and stemming the flowing of teachers out
of state. In 2000, for example, the Oklahoma state legislature mandated a $3,000
increase in teacher salaries. Regarding the increase, the state superintended remarked,
"Out-of-state recruiters are stealing our teachers. We knew we had to do something,"
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suggesting that the salary raise was intended to curb the exit of teachers from the state
(Blair 2000).
Although policymakers appear to believe that they can affect flows of teachers
across state lines via salary or other policy instruments, there has been little empirical
research into what influences the choice of the state in which to begin one's teaching
career. Using data on beginning public school teachers from the Schools and Staffing
Survey, this paper estimates a conditional logit model to investigate the determinants of
this location decision. In particular, I seek to estimate the marginal effects of state
characteristics on the likelihood that a teacher who recently graduated from college in
statej chooses to teach in state k. The key state characteristics of interest include salary,
student characteristics, and geographic proximity to the college state. I also explore
whether the influence of these characteristics on the location decision varies with teacher
quality, as measured by the selectivity of the teacher's undergraduate institution and type
of degree held.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on
potential determinants of the teacher location decision. I then describe the econometric
model used to examine the choice of teaching state. After describing the data, I present
the results of the conditional logit analysis. The final section concludes.
3.2. Background
Numerous studies have inferred the influence of various student and school
characteristics from the pattern of movements of teachers across schools or out of the
teaching profession. Early work by Greenberg and McCall (1974) investigates the
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movement of teachers within the San Diego school system. As salary schedules
generally do not vary across schools within a given school system, they hypothesize that
movement across schools should, in part, reflect teacher preferences over nonpecuniary
characteristics of schools, particularly student characteristics. They find that teachers
tend to move toward schools with lower minority enrollment percentages, higher
achievement scores, and lower percentages of families on welfare. Studies examining
movements of teachers across districts within states suggest similar teacher preferences.
In recent work examining the influence of various characteristics on teacher transitions in
Georgia, Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (forthcoming) argue that the strong
tendency of teachers to leave schools with high minority populations largely drives the
observed tendencies of teachers to leave schools with lower income or lower test scores.
Regarding the influence of salary, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) find evidence from
their analysis of Texas public schools suggesting that salary influences teacher mobility,
with higher salaries being associated with lower rates of transferring either to other
schools or out of the Texas public school system. However, they note that the likelihood
of a teacher exiting a school correlates more strongly with student characteristics than
with salary.
While most previous research has not investigated the spatial geography of
teacher labor markets, recent work by Boyd et al (2005) explores distance as a factor
affecting the location decisions of teachers. Their study of first-time public school
teachers in New York state indicates that teachers prefer jobs in close geographic
proximity to their hometowns. However, their work does not assess the importance of
distance relative to other key determinants, as they do not include student characteristics
or teacher salaries in their analysis.
Understanding the role that these factors play in the location decisions of well-
qualified teachers can help inform debates over how to improve teacher quality. As with
teachers overall, evidence suggests that better qualified teachers prefer lower minority,
lower poverty, and higher performing schools. In exploring the distribution of teachers
across schools in New York state, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002) find a negative
correlation between the percentages of minority, low-income, and low-performing
students in a school and the percentage of well-qualified teachers within a school, where
measures of qualifications include competitiveness of the college attended by the teacher
and the passage of a test of general knowledge. In related work by Boyd et al (2002), the
authors find that the initial job placement of better-qualified teachers in lower performing
schools accounts for more of this sorting than does the pattern of exits and transfers of
more qualified teachers to preferred schools. Regarding the influence of distance, Boyd
et al (2005) find that teachers with higher SAT scores are slightly more likely to select
jobs farther from their hometowns.
Evidence of the influence of salaries on the location decisions of well-qualified
teachers is mixed. Ballou and Podgursky (1997) explore the relationship between
changes in state teacher salaries relative to the earnings of other college-educated workers
and changes in teacher quality without controlling for student or other state
characteristics. Their main analysis yields no evidence of a relationship between average
teacher qualifications and whether the state experienced high, moderate, or low growth in
relative teacher salaries. However, one of the analysis checks they perform indicates that
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the proportion of teachers from selective colleges increased significantly in high-growth
states and decreased significantly in low-growth states. At the district level, unilateral
pay raises may be effective in attracting well-qualified teachers. Figlio (2002) finds
evidence that nonunion school districts that raise their salaries relative to other districts in
the same comunty increase their likelihood of hiring teachers who graduated from selective
colleges or who majored in their teaching field.
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by assessing the influence of these
key factors as determinants of initial teacher location decisions across states. Much of
the previous research uses state-specific datasets that preclude an investigation of teacher
movements across state lines. Using a national dataset, I estimate the influence of salary,
distance, and student characteristics on the probability that a teacher who recently
graduated from college locates in a particular state.
3.3. Econometric Model
To investigate the initial teacher location decision, this paper utilizes the
conditional logit model developed by McFadden (1973), also known as McFadden's
choice model. In deciding where to begin her teaching career, each recently graduated
teacher considers the characteristics of all the states and chooses the state that maximizes
her utility.25  The conditional logit model26 has often been used for analyzing such
25 Though a new teacher may not be able to choose a particular school or district in which to begin her
career, the model assumes that sufficient teaching opportunities exist to allow new teachers to choose their
initial teaching state.
26 Terminology varies in the literature. Typically, the term "multinomial logit model" refers to models in
which the choice of alternatives is expressed as a function only of the attributes of the individual making
the choice, and the term "conditional logit model" refers to models in which the choice is expressed as a
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location decisions, as it allows for the modeling of the choice among alternatives as a
function of the characteristics of the alternatives. 27
McFadden derives the conditional logit model from random utility models,
beginning with the assumption that individuals rationally make choices that maximize
their utility subject to expenditure constraints. The presence of imperfect information
and imperfect optimization leads to the assumption that utility has a random component.
Suppose that for an individual i from place of origin j facing K choices, the perceived
utility of a particular choice k is Uyk = Zyk3 + cuk, where Xyk is a vector of choice-specific
characteristics and individual attributes. Given the rationality assumption, an individual
selecting choice k implies that Uyk is the maximum among the K utilities. Thus, the
probability that choice k is made is Prob(Uuk > Uy,,m) for all m#k. As shown by
McFadden (1973), under the assumption that cEk are independently and identically
distributed with an extreme value distribution, the probability of individual i from placej
choosing option k, Pyk, is given by the following.
K
Pijk - exp[Z kI]/: exp[Z kP]
k= 1
Estimates of the parameter vector 8, which is constant across choices, can then be
obtained using maximum likelihood methods.
function of the characteristics of the alternatives. Some researchers, however, use the term multinomial
logit model even for models that are functions of alternative-specific characteristics.
27 Polsky et al (2002) conduct a similar analysis for doctors, using a conditional logit model to assess the
initial practice location choices of recent medical graduates. In addition to the previously described Boyd
et al (2005) study of the location decisions of New York teachers, recent applications of the conditional
logit model include studies of college choice (Long 2004b) and the location choice of welfare recipients
(O'Keefe 2004).
84
In the teacher location choice model used in this analysis, Z4k' is defined as
follows.
Zijk' = PlIXjkl ± P2(Xjk2Wi2) ± 33Xjk3 + -4(Xjk4Wi4) +... ± ijk
This model views the state in which the teacher attended college as the state of origin.2 8
The K state choices include remaining in the college state j or choosing to teach in
another state. The variables Xjk are characteristics of the K potential destination states
that may influence the probability of a recently graduated teacher locating in a given
state; thej subscript reflects the fact that some of the characteristics of the state choices-
namely distance and nonmigration, as defined below-depend on the college state. The
variables Wi are teacher attributes. Any terms that do not vary across the choices cancel
out of the probability expression. Consequently, to allow for variation in the importance
of the state variables across teachers, I follow the common practice in the literature and
include interactions between the state characteristics and teacher attributes, XjkWi. 29
As noted earlier, the previous literature suggests that salary, student
characteristics, and distance from place of origin factor into the location decision. To
assess the influence of salary in the choice of state, I include the average beginning salary
offered in the state, as obtained by averaging the district salaries paid to beginning
teachers with a bachelor's degree. Variables describing student characteristics include
28 Ideally, I would like to investigate mobility over a specified period time after obtaining the
undergraduate degree. The Schools and Staffing Survey, however, includes data on only the current
teaching state and the state from which the teacher graduated; other changes in location cannot be tracked
in this dataset.
29 Note that the main effects of the teacher attributes drop out of the model. Scott, Coomes, and Izyumov
(2005) emphasize the importance of including such interactions in their study of the initial location choice
of employment-based immigrants. Other recent examples of allowing for the influence of individual
attributes in conditional logit models by interacting individual attributes with choice characteristics include
Boyd et al. (2005) and Long (2004a).
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the average fraction of district students that are minority and the average fraction of
district students that are eligible for free or reduced price lunch. As a crude measure of
student achievement, I use the average high school graduation rate of twelfth graders. 30
As a measure of distance, I include a quadratic in the distance between the college state
and the teaching state being considered.31 While the distance measures control for the
variable costs associated with moving, I also follow common practice and include a
nonmigration indicator variable that captures the fixed costs associated with moving
away from the state of origin. The nonmigration dummy equals one if the destination
state under consideration is the same state as the college state (that is, k = j) and equals
zero otherwise. Other covariates include the following variables that potentially affect
the supply of and demand for teachers or reflect general labor market conditions in the
state: state enrollment, the fraction of schools located in urban settings (large or mid-size
cities), the fraction of districts that have collective bargaining agreements with teacher
unions, and the state unemployment rate. Finally, the model includes state fixed effects
to control for unobserved characteristics of the states that do not vary over time.
The importance of state characteristics in the location decision may vary with the
teacher's own attributes. Of particular interest for policymakers seeking to improve
30 The school record component of the Schools and Staffing Survey reports the percentage of twelfth
graders who graduated the previous school year. Lack of comparability or availability across states
precludes the use of more common indicators of academic achievement in this analysis. The National
Assessment of Educational Progress, often called the "nation's report card," provides an achievement
measure that could potentially be compared across states; however, national samples are not designed to be
representative at the state level, and some states choose not to participate in state assessments. Similarly,
annual dropout rates may be calculated for some states from the Common Core of Data, but not all states
report their dropout data. Measures such as average SAT scores cannot be compared directly across states
due to variation in the proportion and composition of students taking such tests.
31 I used the Great Circle Distance Formula to calculate the distance between the geographic centers of the
fifty states and Washington, DC. The variables included in the model measure distance in thousands of
miles.
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teacher quality is the question of whether the influence of state characteristics such as
average salary changes with the qualifications of the teacher. To allow for such variation,
I estimate specifications that include interactions between the state characteristics and the
following teacher attributes: selectivity of undergraduate institution attended, sex, age,
and race/ethnicity.
As noted in the introduction, some policymakers appear to believe that raising the
overall level of salaries in a state may affect the flow of teachers into and out of the state.
To explore this proposition, I also estimate a model in which I replace the salary variable
with a time-varying indicator variable, Law, that turns on in 1999 if the legislature of the
state mandated at least one teacher pay raise between 1993 and 1999. Results from the
previous chapters of this thesis indicate that the passage of such mandates led to real
increases in teacher salaries. The coefficient on Law in this model provides a reduced
form estimate of the impact of a widespread teacher pay raise on the likelihood of a
teacher choosing to begin her teaching career in a state.
Chapter two of this thesis found that the retention effects of salary varies with the
subject matter expertise of the teacher, as measured by the type of degree held. To
explore whether teachers with different types of degrees also vary in their responsiveness
to salary and other state characteristics when deciding where to begin teaching, I analyze
results separately for teachers with academic degrees and teachers with education
32degrees. 32 As concerns about subject matter expertise tend to be particularly strong at the
32 Some teachers have more than one major field of study. As explained in chapter two of this thesis, I
place a teacher in the education degree category if all of her majors fall into the education fields, which
include general education (e.g., elementary education), subject area education (e.g., science education),
special education (e.g., speech/language impaired), or other education (e.g., curriculum and instruction). If
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secondary level where teachers must instruct students in relatively advanced concepts in
departmentalized courses, I also repeat the analyses for a subsample of secondary school
teachers.
3.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sample of recent college graduates who entered teaching used in this analysis
comes from the 1993-94 and 1999-2000 rounds of the Schools and Staffing Survey
(SASS). In addition to providing demographic information, the teacher component of the
SASS reports the year the individual began teaching as well as key education data,
including the undergraduate institution attended by the teacher, her major, and the year in
which she earned her degree. To focus on the initial location decisions of recent college
graduates, I identify for the analysis sample full-time public school teachers in regular
elementary and secondary schools who both earned their bachelor's degree and began
teaching within three years of the survey. I also link the undergraduate institution
information to data from a college guide on the selectivity of the institutions.33 The main
sample consists of 6,996 teachers with nonmissing data, each of whom faces a choice of
fifty-one locations, including the fifty states and the District of Columbia.34 State
any of her major fields of study occurred in a discipline outside of the education fields, I define the teacher
as having an academic degree.
33 The selectivity data come from the 1990 Lovejoy's guide. The selectivity ranking ranges from 1 to 5,
with 5 denoting the most selective institution.
34 To estimate the conditional logit model, the data must be arranged such that each individual i has J
records, where each of the J records represents one of the alternatives available to the individual. The
dependent variable is a choice indicator variable that equals one for the alternative chosen by individual i
and zero for the alternatives not chosen. Given this data structure, the number of observations in the
analysis exceeds the number of individuals in the sample. Since the sample used here consists of 6,996
teachers who each choose from one of 51 alternatives, the analysis contains 6,996 x 51 = 356,796
observations.
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characteristics concerning salary, enrollment, fraction minority, fraction eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch, high school graduation rates, urbanicity, and collective
bargaining are derived as weighted averages of data from the SASS district and school
records. Data on state unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The specification involving mandated pay raises utilizes data obtained primarily
by compiling information for the years 1993 through 1999 from legislative summaries
reported in the periodical Education Week and from searches of state statutes. During
this time period, nineteen states passed legislation requiring teacher pay raises. On
average, the salary paid to beginning teachers with bachelor's degrees increased by about
7 percent in districts located in states that mandated pay raises relative to districts in
states without such mandates. 35
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics describing the teacher sample and key state
characteristics by survey year. Each survey year, about 19 percent of beginning teachers
who recently graduated from college chose to teach in a state other than the state in which
they attended college. Nearly 10 percent of the new teachers attended highly selective
undergraduate institutions, defined as a college or university ranked as a 4 or 5 on a five-
point selectivity index. Regarding state characteristics, average state unemployment
declined and enrollment increased over the time period studied, while means for other
variables remained fairly stable.
35 See chapter one of this thesis for the demonstration of this result and for additional information on the
mandates and the varied factors influencing their passage.
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3.5. Results
Table 3.2 presents the results of estimating the conditional logit model of the
initial teacher location decision for the full sample of beginning teachers. Column (1)
displays estimates for the specification that includes only state characteristics with no
interactions with individual attributes. Column (2) adds interactions with teacher
demographic variables, namely dummies for male, black, Hispanic, and age greater than
or equal to thirty. Finally, column (3) adds interactions with indicators for graduating
from a highly selective undergraduate institution and for holding a master's or higher
degree. Following Kaushal (2005), the table reports the marginal effects evaluated at the
mean probability of choosing a state. Table A.1 in the appendix reports the
corresponding coefficients from the conditional logit model.
The estimates of the marginal effects of state characteristics on the probability of
a beginning teacher locating in a given state are generally similar across the
specifications. As seen by comparing estimates in columns (1) through (3), neither the
magnitude nor the statistical significance of the estimates changes substantially with the
addition of interactions with teacher attributes. The discussion below focuses on the
estimates presented in column (3) for the specification that includes the full set of
interactions. Taking into account all of the interactions, the main effects reported in
column (3) represent the estimated influence of each state characteristic on the likelihood
of a state being chosen by a typical female, non-Black, non-Hispanic, teacher under the
age of thirty who recently graduated from a non-highly-selective college and who does
not hold a master's or higher degree.
Both the geographic proximity of the teaching state to the college state and the
racial composition of the state's students appear to weigh heavily in the location decision.
As evidenced by the magnitude and significance of the estimates for nonmigration and
distance, recent college graduates demonstrate a strong propensity to begin teaching in or
near the state in which they earned their bachelor's degree. Attending college in a given
state increases a beginning teacher's likelihood of starting her teaching career in that state
by approximately 6 percentage points, all else equal. Increasing the distance between the
college state and the state under consideration by 1,000 miles decreases the likelihood of
a new teacher choosing to locate in the state by more than 5 percentage points. Distance
appears to be slightly less of a deterrent for teachers from more selective institutions, as
indicated by the significant positive interaction effect, but these teachers still exhibit a
strong preference for teaching near their college states. Consistent with the previous
literature examining movements across schools and districts, the findings also suggest
that teachers prefer locations with relatively low proportions of minority students.
There is limited evidence suggesting that several other state characteristics affect
teachers' initial location choices. The signs and magnitudes of the marginal effects
indicate that the typical beginning teacher tends to prefer states with larger enrollments,
lower proportions of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, higher graduations
rates, higher fractions of urban districts, and higher fractions of districts with collective
bargaining agreements. However, the estimates for these characteristics have relatively
large standard errors and are not statistically significant. The negative signs on most of
the estimates for unemployment suggests that teachers prefer states with lower
unemployment; rates, but these marginal effects are smaller in magnitude than those of
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other characteristics and are imprecisely estimated. Although only a few statistically
significant interaction effects emerge, there is some suggestion that the influence of these
characteristics varies with the attributes of the teachers. For example, the estimates
suggest black teachers strongly prefer urban areas and are more willing than other
teachers to locate in lower income areas, as proxied by student eligibility for free or
reduced-price lunch.
Notably, there is no evidence of average salaries significantly influencing the
location choice of the typical teacher. Table 3.3 highlights the estimated effects of salary
on teacher choice using two different salary measures: the first three columns repeat the
estimates from Table 3.2 using average state salary and the last three columns reports
results from estimating the models using a salary mandate dummy.36 As argued in
chapter one of this thesis, the passage of a statewide salary mandate during the time
period analyzed provides a source of variation in teacher salaries that is plausibly
exogenous with respect to teacher qualifications. Regardless of which measure is used,
the main effect of the salary is both very small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant. The marginal effect of the interaction of average salary with the selectivity
dummy suggests a $10,000 increase in a state's average salary (1999 dollars) is
associated with a 1.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing a state for
teachers from highly selective institutions relative to teachers from less selective
colleges; however, this interaction effect becomes negligible when using the salary
36 Table A.2 in the appendix reports the corresponding coefficients from the conditional logit model for the
specifications that use the law dummy.
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mandate dummy. Overall, the estimates do not support the notion that higher overall
levels of teacher pay lure new teachers into a state.
Academic vs. Education Degrees
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report the results of estimating the full model separately for
teachers with academic degrees and teachers with education degrees. The similarity of
the estimates of the effects of nonmigration and distance (Table 3.4) indicates that the
propensity to choose states in close proximity to the college state does not vary with
degree type. As found for the full sample of teachers, neither group demonstrates a
significant responsiveness to average state salary in choosing their initial teaching state.
The negative interaction effect of average salary with the indicator for attending a highly
selective college appears to be stronger among teachers with academic degrees than those
with education degrees; however, as seen in Table 3.5, the effect does not persist in the
model that uses state salary mandates as the source of variation in salary.
While the effects of geographic proximity and salary appear to be broadly similar
across teachers with academic degrees and those with education degrees, the evidence
suggests some differences in the influence of state characteristics across the groups. In
particular, the marginal effects of state enrollment and fraction minority enrollment
appear to affect the location choice of teachers with academic degrees more strongly than
that of teachers with education degrees. The main effects of enrollment indicate that
increasing state enrollment by one million students increases the likelihood of a teacher
with an academic degree choosing the state by a statistically significant 3.1 percentage
points, compared to an insignificant .009 increase for teachers with education degrees.
93
Minority student enrollment appears to have a negative effect on the likelihood of either
group choosing a state, but the negative effect is stronger for the teachers with academic
degrees. Patterns for other state characteristics are less clear. Differences emerge for a
few of the interactions of individual attributes with state characteristics-for example,
relatively large positive effects of the average graduation rate and fraction of school
districts that are urban occur for male teachers with academic degrees in contrast to
negligible effects of these characteristics for male teachers with education degrees-but
many of the estimates are imprecise.
Secondary School Teachers
As seen in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, the main findings for the full sample of teachers
hold for the subsample of secondary school teachers as well. Secondary school teachers
exhibit a strong preference for beginning their teaching careers in or near the state in
which they attended college, although some subgroups of teachers such as those from
highly selective undergraduate institutions are less deterred by distance than others.
Regardless of whether one uses the average state salary or the salary mandate dummy,
the estimates yield no evidence of a significant relationship between state beginning
teacher salary levels and the probability of a teacher choosing a particular state. The
estimates indicate a strong negative association between a state's fraction minority
students and the likelihood of a secondary teacher choosing the state. Estimates for other
characteristics tend to be imprecise, but the signs of the marginal effects suggest that
teachers prefer states with larger enrollments and higher fractions of districts with
collective bargaining agreements. The effects of graduation rates and urbanicity appear
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to vary with teacher characteristics, and there is no evidence of a substantial impact on
unemployment.
The patterns across secondary school teachers with academic degrees versus
education degrees are similar to those found for the full sample of teachers (Tables 3.8
and 3.9). The marginal effects of the nonmigration dummy and distance are large and of
similar magnitude for both types of teachers. The effects of salary tend to be small and
statistically insignificant. Also as found for the full sample, stronger enrollment effects
emerge for teachers with academic degrees than those with education degrees.
3.6. Conclusions
Evidence from estimating a conditional logit model of the initial location choice
of beginning teachers strongly indicates that geographic proximity to the college state and
minority enrollment dominate other measured state characteristics in the teacher location
decision. Recent college graduates exhibit a strong preference for teaching in the state
from which they graduated. For those new teachers who do migrate to another state,
distance plays a significant role in the choice of state, with the probability of locating in
the state decreasing as the distance from the college state increases. Teachers also prefer
states with lower proportions of minority students. Although the strength of preferences
over different characteristics sometimes varies with individual attributes, geographic
proximity and minority enrollment appear to weigh heavily in the location choice of
teachers, regardless of the selectivity of their undergraduate institution, their subject
matter expertise, the level of school taught, or other teacher characteristics.
While previous research indicates a significant effect of salary on the choice of
district or school within a state, the results of this analysis suggest that the effect of salary
does not hold at the state level. The estimates yielded no evidence of an effect of a
state's average beginning teacher salary on the location decision. Legislating a
widespread pay raise does not appear to significantly affect a beginning teacher's
willingness to locate in a particular state.
The findings suggest that state policymakers face considerable difficulties in
attempting to recruit qualified teachers from other states. The propensity for recent
college graduates to begin teaching in the same state in which they earned their bachelor's
degrees casts doubt on the efficacy of devoting resources to recruiting out of state. This
study does not examine the effects of other recruitment strategies, such as offering
bonuses to particular teachers. However, the importance of factors over which
policymakers have no control-such as geographic proximity to the college state and the
proportion of minority enrollment-raises doubts about the success of widespread pay
raises and other general out-of-state recruitment strategies in attracting highly qualified
recent college graduates from other states.
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics
1993 1999
N = 3478 N = 3518
Mean Mean
(Standard Deviation) (Standard Deviation)
Teacher Characteristics
Teach Outside of College State
Attended Highly Selective
Undergraduate Institution
Academic Degree
Master's Degree or Higher
Male
Black
Hispanic
Age
State Characteristics
Starting Salary
Enrollment
Fraction Minority Students
Fraction of Students Eligible for
Free or Reduced-Price Lunch
1 2th Grade Graduation Rate
Fraction Urban
Fraction of Districts with
Collective Bargaining
Unemployment Rate
0.188
(0.391)
0.094
(0.292)
0.313
(0.464)
0.068
(0.253)
0.316
(0.465)
0.037
(0.188)
0.062
(0.240)
29.3
(6.51)
25,105
(3,502)
829,454
(931,972)
0.216
(0.209)
0.458
(0.137)
0.913
(0.062)
0.221
(0.153)
0.586
(0.405)
6.37
(1.51)
0.193
(0.395)
0.094
(0.292)
0.364
(0.481)
0.083
(0.275)
0.330
(0.470)
0.063
(0.243)
0.063
(0.244)
27.8
(6.34)
25,568
(3,243)
896,434
(1,030,764)
0.242
(0.206)
0.406
(0.129)
0.897
(0.066)
0.223
(0.140)
0.597
(0.407)
4.16
(1.05)
Notes: With the exception of enrollment and the unemployment rate, state characteristics are calculated as
weighted averages across all public schools or districts in the Schools and Staffing Survey. State
enrollment is calculated as the weighted sum of district enrollments. The state unemployment rate comes
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Salaries are converted to 1999 dollars using the CPI-U.
Table 3.2. Marginal Effects of State Characteristics on the Choice of Initial Teaching State
No Interactions
Salary (per $10,000)
Salary X Male
Salary X Black
Salary X Hispanic
Salary X Age 30+
Salary X High Select
Salary X Master's
Nonmigration
Nonmig X Male
Nonmig X Black
Nonmig X Hispanic
Nonmig X Age 30+
Nonmig X High Select
(1)
0.0001
(0.007)
0.062
(0.003)
Interactions with
Demographic
Attributes
(2)
-0.001(0.007)
0.001(0.004)
0.004
(0.011)
0.005
(0.011)
0.004
(0.005)
0.060(0.003)
0.002(0.003)
0.003
(0.006)
0.014
(0.009)
0.003
(0.004)
Nonmig X Master's
Distance (per 1,000 miles)
Dist X Male
-0.051
(0.005)
Dist X Black
Dist X Hispanic
Dist X Age 30+
Dist X High Select
Dist X Master's
Enrollment
(per 1,000,000 students)
Enroll X Male
0.021
(0.012)
Enroll X Black
-0.051(0.005)
0.004(0.003)
-0.005(0.006)
0.004(0.009)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.020
(0.012)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.003)
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Interactions with
All Attributes
(3)
0.002
(0.007)
0.001
(0.004)
0.003
(0.011)
0.005
(0.011)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.015
(0.006)
0.005
(0.005)
0.060
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.003
(0.006)
0.014
(0.009)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.003(0.005)
-0.055(0.005)
0.004(0.003)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.015
(0.003)
0.001
(0.004)
0.019
(0.012)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.003)
(Table 3.2. continued)
Enroll X Hispanic
Enroll X Age 30+
Enroll X High Select
Enroll X Master's
Fraction Minority
Minority X Male
Minority X Black
Minority X Hispanic
Minority X Age 30+
Minority X High Select
Minority X Master's
Fraction Lunch
Lunch X Male
Lunch X Black
Lunch X Hispanic
Lunch X Age 30+
Lunch X High Select
Lunch X Master's
Graduation Rate
Grad Rate X Male
Grad Rate X Black
Grad Rate X Hispanic
Grad Rate X Age 30+
Grad Rate X High Select
Grad Rate X Master's
0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.082
(0.039)
-0.004
(0.010)
0.030
(0.019)
0.002
(0.025)
0.007
(0.010)
-0.076
(0.039)
-0.018
(0.016)
0.025
(0.032)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
-0.0001
(0.002)
-0.087
(0.040)
-0.003
(0.010)
0.031
(0.019)
0.005
(0.025)
0.008
(0.010)
0.010
(0.015)
0.004
(0.015)
-0.021
(0.017)
0.010
(0.010)
0.049
(0.026)
0.019
(0.027)
0.006
(0.016)
-0.015
(0.015)
-0.044
(0.021)
0.019
(0.037)
0.028
(0.018)
-0.059
(0.036)
0.012
(0.039)
0.008
(0.026)
-0.021
(0.028)
-0.002
(0.028)
-0.028
(0.016)
0.012
(0.010)
0.049
(0.026)
0.021
(0.028)
0.006
(0.016)
0.016
(0.035)
0.029
(0.018)
-0.057
(0.036)
0.015
(0.040)
0.009
(0.026)
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Fraction Urban
Urban X Male
Urban X Black
Urban X Hispanic
Urban X Age 30+
Urban X High Select
(Table 3.2. continued)
0.013
(0.019)
0.011
(0.019)
0.014
(0.010)
0.045
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.025)
-0.017
(0.010)
Urban X Master's
Fraction Coll. Bargaining
Coll Barg X Male
Coll Barg X Black
Coll Barg X Hispanic
Coll Barg X Age 30+
Coll Barg X High Select
Coll Barg X Master's
Unemployment Rate
Unemp X Male
0.035
(0.029)
-0.002
(0.001)
Unemp X Black
Unemp X Hispanic
Unemp X Age 30+
Unemp X High Select
Unemp X Master's
0.032
(0.029)
0.003
(0.004)
0.010
(0.010)
0.017
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.22
-0.002
(0.002)
0.005
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
0.010
(0.019)
0.013
(0.010)
0.047
(0.016)
-0.015
(0.025)
-0.016
(0.011)
0.015
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.013)
0.032
(0.030)
0.003
(0.004)
0.011
(0.010)
0.018
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.007
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.18
-0.003
(0.002)
0.005
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.0004
(0.002)
Number of Individuals 6996 6996 6996
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects of state characteristics on the probability of a beginning
teacher i who graduated from college in state j choosing to teach in state k. State characteristics are
measured for each potential destination state, including the college state. The values of distance and
nonmigration for destination state k depend on college state j (see text for variable definitions). The
marginal effects are computed around the mean probability of choosing a state. The main effects of the
teacher attributes drop out of the probability expression for the conditional logit model. All specifications
include state fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within college state by survey year.
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Table 3.4. Marginal Effects of State Characteristics on Choice of Initial Teaching State
by Teacher Degree Type
Teachers with Teachers withAll Teachers
Academic Degrees Education Degrees(1) (2) (3)
Salary (per $10,000) 0.002 -0.003 -0.0003
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Salary X Male 0.001 0.005 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Salary X Black 0.003 -0.002 0.009
(0.011) (0.019) (0.013)
Salary X Hispanic 0.005 -0.006 0.010
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Salary X Age 30+ 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Salary X High Select -0.015 -0.018 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Salary X Master's 0.005 0.009 0.008
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Nonmigration 0.060 0.059 0.060
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Nonmig X Male 0.001 0.009 -0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Nonmig X Black 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Nonmig X Hispanic 0.014 0.023 0.010
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Nonmig X Age 30+ 0.004 -0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Nonmig X High Select -0.005 -0.012 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Nonmig X Master's -0.003 -0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Distance (per 1,000 miles) -0.055 -0.053 -0.056
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Dist X Male 0.004 0.009 -0.0002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Dist X Black -0.004 -0.003 -0.007
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Dist X Hispanic 0.004 0.013 -0.003
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Dist X Age 30+ -0.003 -0.007 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Dist X High Select 0.015 0.011 0.014
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Dist X Master's 0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Enrollment 0.019 0.031 0.009
(per 1,000,000 students) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013)
Enroll X Male 0.001 0.002 0.0001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Enroll X Black 0.002 0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
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Enroll X Hispanic
Enroll X Age 30+
Enroll X High Select
Enroll X Master's
Fraction Minority
Minority X Male
Minority X Black
Minority X Hispanic
Minority X Age 30+
Minority X High Select
Minority X Master's
Fraction Lunch
Lunch X Male
Lunch X Black
Lunch X Hispanic
Lunch X Age 30+
Lunch X High Select
Lunch X Master's
Graduation Rate
Grad Rate X Male
Grad Rate X Black
Grad Rate X Hispanic
Grad Rate X Age 30+
Grad Rate X High Select
Grad Rate X Master's
(Table 3.4. continued)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
-0.0001
(0.002)
-0.087
(0.040)
-0.003
(0.010)
0.031
(0.019)
0.005
(0.025)
0.008
(0.010)
0.010
(0.015)
0.004
(0.015)
-0.021
(0.017)
0.010
(0.010)
0.049
(0.026)
0.019
(0.027)
0.006
(0.016)
-0.015
(0.015)
-0.044
(0.021)
0.019
(0.037)
0.028
(0.018)
-0.059
(0.036)
0.012
(0.039)
0.008
(0.026)
-0.021
(0.028)
-0.002
(0.028)
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0.007
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.140
(0.048)
-0.005
(0.014)
0.035
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.038)
0.029
(0.014)
0.012
(0.019)
0.018
(0.020)
-0.010
(0.023)
0.027
(0.017)
0.056
(0.040)
0.033
(0.038)
-0.015
(0.026)
-0.024
(0.023)
-0.090
(0.028)
-0.036
(0.044)
0.092
(0.028)
-0.053
(0.049)
0.063
(0.070)
-0.003
(0.040)
0.001
(0.030)
0.019
(0.040)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.064
(0.045)
-0.001
(0.012)
0.026
(0.031)
0.017
(0.035)
-0.002
(0.012)
0.013
(0.036)
-0.023
(0.028)
-0.024
(0.020)
-0.001
(0.014)
0.044
(0.034)
0.006
(0.038)
0.016
(0.018)
-0.009
(0.029)
0.033
(0.036)
0.046
(0.042)
-0.015
(0.024)
-0.048
(0.056)
-0.027
(0.050)
0.007
(0.031)
-0.064
(0.041)
-0.060
(0.051)
(Table 3.4. continued)
Fraction Urban 0.010 0.023 -0.001
(0.019) (0.024) (0.023)
Urban X Male 0.013 0.037 -0.003
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Urban X Black 0.047 0.020 0.080
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
Urban X Hispanic -0.015 0.027 -0.037
(0.025) (0.036) (0.031)
Urban X Age 30+ -0.016 -0.032 -0.010
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Urban X High Select 0.015 0.010 0.017
(0.013) (0.014) (0.023)
Urban X Master's -0.001 0.0002 -0.004
(0.013) (0.017) (0.024)
Fraction Coll. Bargaining 0.032 0.038 0.027
(0.030) (0.037) (0.033)
Coil Barg X Male 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Coil Barg X Black 0.011 0.015 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Coil Barg X Hispanic 0.018 0.026 0.010
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
Coil Barg X Age 30+ -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Coil Barg X High Select 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Coil Barg X Master's -0.003 -0.007 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Unemployment Rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemp X Male -0.001 -0.002 -0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemp X Black -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Unemp X Hispanic 0.005 0.003 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Unemp X Age 30+ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Unemp X High Select -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Unemp X Master's 0.0004 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of Individuals 6996 2371 4625
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects of state characteristics on the probability of a beginning
teacher i who graduated from college in state j choosing to teach in state k. State characteristics are
measured for each potential destination state, including the college state. The values of distance and
nonmigration for destination state k depend on college state j (see text for variable definitions). The
marginal effects are computed around the mean probability of choosing a state. The main effects of the
teacher attributes drop out of the probability expression for the conditional logit model. All specifications
include state fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within college state by survey year.
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Table 3.6. Marginal Effects of State Characteristics on the Choice of Initial Teaching State
for Secondary School Teachers
Salary (per $10,000)
Salary X Male
Salary X Black
Salary X Hispanic
Salary X Age 30+
Salary X High Select
Salary X Master's
Nonmigration
Nonmig X Male
Nonmig X Black
Nonmig X Hispanic
Nonmig X Age 30+
Nonmig X High Select
Nonmig X Master's
Distance (per 1,000 miles)
Dist X Male
No Interactions
(1)
-0.004
(0.009)
0.059(0.003)
-0.049(0.006)
Dist X Black
Dist X Hispanic
Dist X Age 30+
Dist X High Select
Dist X Master's
Enrollment
(per 1,000,000 students)
Enroll X Male
0.027
(0.016)
Enroll X Black
Interactions with
DemographicAttributes
(2)
-0.008
(0.009)
0.004
(0.005)
0.0001
(0.013)
0.016
(0.014)
0.005
(0.005)
0.055
(0.003)
0.005
(0.004)
0.008
(0.008)
0.025
(0.013)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.053(0.006)
0.008(0.003)
0.003(0.006)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.025
(0.016)
0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
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Interactions with
All Attributes
(3)
-0.007
(0.009)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.013)
0.013
(0.015)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.007)
0.011
(0.006)
0.054(0.004)
0.005
(0.003)
0.008(0.007)
0.024
(0.013)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.058
(0.007)
0.008
(0.003)
0.004(0.006)
0.010(0.010)
0.001
(0.004)
0.018
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
0.023
(0.015)
0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
(Table 3.6. continued)
Enroll X Hispanic
Enroll X Age 30+
Enroll X High Select
Enroll X Master's
Fraction Minority
Minority X Male
Minority X Black
Minority X Hispanic
Minority X Age 30+
Minority X High Select
Minority X Master's
Fraction Lunch
Lunch X Male
Lunch X Black
Lunch X Hispanic
Lunch X Age 30+
Lunch X High Select
Lunch X Master's
Graduation Rate
Grad Rate X Male
Grad Rate X Black
Grad Rate X Hispanic
Grad Rate X Age 30+
Grad Rate X High Select
Grad Rate X Master's
0.003
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.106
(0.046)
0.014
(0.014)
0.049
(0.027)
0.018
(0.030)
0.007
(0.015)
-0.092
(0.046)
-0.011
(0.019)
-0.001
(0.038)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.004
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.112
(0.046)
0.016
(0.014)
0.048
(0.028)
0.025
(0.031)
0.007
(0.015)
0.003
(0.020)
0.022
(0.025)
-0.007
(0.022)
-0.001
(0.016)
0.034
(0.035)
0.008
(0.041)
0.006
(0.019)
-0.028
(0.021)
-0.040
(0.030)
-0.034
(0.040)
0.064
(0.020)
-0.041
(0.045)
0.017
(0.051)
0.002
(0.033)
-0.017(0.030)
0.026
(0.038)
-0.015
(0.022)
0.001
(0.016)
0.033
(0.035)
0.013
(0.040)
0.006
(0.019)
-0.029
(0.039)
0.065
(0.020)
-0.037
(0.046)
0.031
(0.051)
0.001
(0.034)
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Fraction Urban
Urban X Male
Urban X Black
Urban X Hispanic
Urban X Age 30+
Urban X High Select
Urban X Master's
Fraction Collective
Bargaining
Coil Barg X Male
Coll Barg X Black
Coll Barg X Hispanic
Coll Barg X Age 30+
Coil Barg X High Select
Coll Barg X Master's
Unemployment Rate
Unemp X Male
(Table 3.6. continued)
0.013
(0.023)
0.035
(0.039)
-0.002(0.002)
Unemp X Black
Unemp X Hispanic
Unemp X Age 30+
Unemp X High Select
Unemp X Master's
Number of Individuals 4427 4427 4427
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects of state characteristics on the probability of a beginning
teacher i who graduated from college in state j choosing to teach in state k. State characteristics are
measured for each potential destination state, including the college state. The values of distance and
nonmigration for destination state k depend on college state j (see text for variable definitions). The
marginal effects are computed around the mean probability of choosing a state. The main effects of the
teacher attributes drop out of the probability expression for the conditional logit model. All specifications
include state fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within college state by survey year.
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0.007
(0.022)
0.022
(0.013)
0.009
(0.022)
-0.010
(0.035)
-0.011
(0.013)
0.008
(0.023)
0.024
(0.014)
0.005
(0.021)
-0.012
(0.036)
-0.014
(0.014)
-0.023
(0.019)
0.020
(0.018)
0.030
(0.039)
0.006
(0.005)
0.015
(0.011)
0.021
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.007)
-0.0004
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.0002
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.002)
-0.0001
(0.003)
0.030
(0.038)
0.006
(0.005)
0.016
(0.011)
0.019
(0.012)
-0.0002
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
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Table 3.8. Marginal Effects of State Characteristics on Choice of Initial Teaching State by
Degree Type for Secondary School Teachers
Teachers with Teachers withAll Teachers
Academic Degrees Education Degrees
(1) (2) (3)
Salary (per $10,000) -0.007 -0.009 -0.006
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Salary X Male 0.003 0.012 -0.003
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Salary X Black -0.001 -0.006 0.003
(0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
Salary X Hispanic 0.013 0.006 0.018
(0.015) (0.017) (0.024)
Salary X Age 30+ 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Salary X High Select -0.008 -0.014 0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
Salary X Master's 0.011 0.011 0.023
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012)
Nonmigration 0.054 0.054 0.055
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Nonmig X Male 0.005 0.012 -0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Nonmig X Black 0.008 0.013 0.006
(0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Nonmig X Hispanic 0.024 0.030 0.026
(0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
Nonmig X Age 30+ 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Nonmig X High Select -0.001 -0.010 0.014
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
Nonmig X Master's -0.004 -0.003 -0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Distance (per 1,000 miles) -0.058 -0.060 -0.058
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Dist X Male 0.008 0.014 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Dist X Black 0.004 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
Dist X Hispanic 0.010 0.016 0.003
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Dist X Age 30+ 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Dist X High Select 0.018 0.012 0.026
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Dist X Master's 0.001 0.004 -0.014
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Enrollment 0.023 0.038 0.006
(per 1,000,000 students) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017)
Enroll X Male 0.001 0.002 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Enroll X Black 0.004 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
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Enroll X Hispanic
Enroll X Age 30+
Enroll X High Select
Enroll X Master's
Fraction Minority
Minority X Male
Minority X Black
Minority X Hispanic
Minority X Age 30+
Minority X High Select
Minority X Master's
Fraction Lunch
Lunch X Male
Lunch X Black
Lunch X Hispanic
Lunch X Age 30+
Lunch X High Select
Lunch X Master's
Graduation Rate
Grad Rate X Male
Grad Rate X Black
Grad Rate X Hispanic
Grad Rate X Age 30+
Grad Rate X -High Select
Grad Rate X Master's
(Table 3.8. continued)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.004
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.112
(0.046)
0.016
(0.014)
0.048
(0.028)
0.025
(0.031)
0.007
(0.015)
0.003
(0.020)
0.022
(0.025)
-0.007
(0.022)
-0.001
(0.016)
0.034
(0.035)
0.008
(0.041)
0.006
(0.019)
-0.028
(0.021)
-0.040
(0.030)
-0.034
(0.040)
0.064
(0.020)
-0.041
(0.045)
0.017
(0.051)
0.002
(0.033)
-0.017
(0.030)
0.026
(0.038)
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0.009
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.146
(0.055)
-0.005
(0.016)
0.051
(0.032)
-0.044
(0.044)
0.026
(0.017)
0.002
(0.022)
0.009
(0.025)
-0.007(0.025)
0.023
(0.019)
0.009
(0.054)
0.032
(0.046)
-0.027
(0.026)
-0.027
(0.027)
-0.059
(0.032)
-0.051
(0.047)
0.127
(0.031)
-0.052
(0.059)
0.071
(0.074)
-0.023
(0.037)
-0.014
(0.033)
0.027
(0.045)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.084
(0.056)
0.029
(0.019)
0.054
(0.051)
0.084
(0.055)
-0.004
(0.018)
-0.008
(0.074)
0.028
(0.029)
-0.009
(0.029)
-0.017
(0.023)
0.059
(0.056)
-0.014
(0.062)
0.027
(0.027)
-0.031
(0.056)
0.006
(0.046)
-0.010
(0.049)
0.003
(0.032)
-0.008
(0.081)
-0.032
(0.072)
0.009
(0.050)
-0.040
(0.056)
0.028
(0.065)
Fraction Urban
Urban X Male
Urban X Black
Urban X Hispanic
Urban X Age 30+
Urban X High Select
Urban X Master's
Fraction Coll. Bargaining
Coll Barg X Male
Coll Barg X Black
Coll Barg X Hispanic
Coll Barg X Age 30+
Coll Barg X High Select
Coll Barg X Master's
Unemployment Rate
Unemp X Male
Unemp X Black
Unemp X Hispanic
Unemp X Age 30+
Unemp X High Select
Unemp X Master's
(Table 3.8. continued)
0.008
(0.023)
0.024
(0.014)
0.005
(0.021)
-0.012
(0.036)
-0.014
(0.014)
-0.023
(0.019)
0.020
(0.018)
0.030
(0.039)
0.006
(0.005)
0.015
(0.011)
0.021
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.007)
-0.0004
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.0002
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.002)
-0.0001
(0.003)
Number of Individuals 4427 1927 2500
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects of state characteristics on the probability of a beginning
teacher i who graduated from college in state j choosing to teach in state k. State characteristics are
measured for each potential destination state, including the college state. The values of distance and
nonmigration for destination state k depend on college state j (see text for variable definitions). The
marginal effects are computed around the mean probability of choosing a state. The main effects of the
teacher attributes drop out of the probability expression for the conditional logit model. All specifications
include state fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within college state by survey year.
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0.026
(0.028)
0.029
(0.019)
-0.020
(0.024)
0.010
(0.052)
-0.029
(0.022)
-0.021
(0.023)
0.026
(0.023)
0.044
(0.041)
-0.001
(0.007)
0.017
(0.012)
0.022
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.0001
(0.005)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.0001
(0.003)
-0.017
(0.029)
0.020
(0.018)
0.053
(0.034)
-0.010
(0.043)
-0.004
(0.017)
-0.017
(0.042)
0.009
(0.030)
0.014
(0.049)
0.013
(0.006)
0.015
(0.016)
0.018
(0.017)
0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.012)
0.007
(0.011)
-0.0001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.0004
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.006)
0.002
(0.003)
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Table A.1. Conditional Logit Model Estimates of the Choice of Initial Teaching State
with Average Salary
No Interactions
Salary (per $10,000)
Salary X Male
Salary X Black
Salary X Hispanic
Salary X Age 30+
Salary X High Select
Salary X Master's
Nonmigration
Nonmig X Male
Nonmig X Black
Nonmig X Hispanic
Nonmig X Age 30+
Nonmig X High Select
(1)
0.006
(0.374)
3.217
(0.139)
Interactions with
Demographic
Attributes
(2)
-0.077
(0.378)
0.054
(0.208)
0.211
(0.561)
0.250
(0.577)
0.193
(0.244)
3.117
(0.140)
0.079
(0.145)
0.158
(0.320)
0.733
(0.452)
0.171
(0.184)
Nonmig X Master's
Distance (per 1,000 miles)
Dist X Male
-3.689
(0.302)
Dist X Black
Dist X Hispanic
Dist X Age 30+
Dist X High Select
Dist X Master's
Distance2 (per 1,0002 miles 2)
Dist2 X Male
0.463
(0.113)
Dist2 X Black
-3.762
(0.313)
0.281
(0.256)
0.044
(0.756)
1.557
(0.784)
-0.343
(0.350)
0.483
(0.119)
-0.034
(0.060)
-0.128
(0.215)
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Interactions with All
Attributes
(3)
0.086
(0.366)
0.039
(0.211)
0.176
(0.555)
0.245
(0.562)
0.087
(0.234)
-0.797
(0.326)
0.281
(0.284)
3.100
(0.144)
0.068
(0.141)
0.169
(0.312)
0.723
(0.455)
0.183
(0.181)
-0.249
(0.214)
-0.166
(0.255)
-4.099
(0.315)
0.297
(0.250)
0.100
(0.752)
1.591
(0.779)
-0.163
(0.349)
1.431
(0.327)
0.132
(0.414)
0.548
(0.114)
-0.038
(0.060)
-0.140
(0.216)
(Table A.1. continued)
Dist2 X Hispanic
Dist2 X Age 30+
Dist2 X High Select
Dist2 X Master's
Enrollment
(per 1,000,000 students)
Enroll X Male
Enroll X Black
Enroll X Hispanic
Enroll X Age 30+
Enroll X High Select
Enroll X Master's
Fraction Minority
Minority X Male
Minority X Black
Minority X Hispanic
Minority X Age 30+
Minority X High Select
Minority X Master's
Fraction Lunch
Lunch X Male
Lunch X Black
Lunch X Hispanic
Lunch X Age 30+
Lunch X High Select
Lunch X Master's
-0.580
(0.243)
0.042
(0.084)
1.068
(0.640)
-3.953
(2.034)
1.055
(0.643)
0.059
(0.058)
0.108
(0.148)
0.146
(0.105)
-0.130
(0.069)
-4.263
(2.033)
-0.206
(0.513)
1.540
(0.984)
0.106
(1.295)
0.382
(0.534)
-0.604
(0.255)
0.007
(0.085)
-0.295
(0.078)
-0.030
(0.094)
1.014
(0.626)
0.066
(0.059)
0.125
(0.150)
0.161
(0.101)
-0.110
(0.066)
0.215
(0.076)
-0.005
(0.105)
-4.550
(2.065)
-0.142
(0.518)
1.604
(1.012)
0.246
(1.314)
0.423
(0.529)
0.506
(0.799)
0.188
(0.757)
-1.084
(0.903)
0.528
(0.540)
2.545
(1.346)
0.973
(1.423)
0.335
(0.815)
-0.805
(0.801)
-2.263
(1.111)
-0.924
(0.809)
-1.448
(0.854)
0.623
(0.543)
2.524
(1.350)
1.071
(1.434)
0.312
(0.835)
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Graduation Rate
Grad Rate X Male
Grad Rate X Black
Grad Rate X Hispanic
Grad Rate X Age 30+
Grad Rate X High Select
Grad Rate X Master's
Fraction Urban
Urban X Male
Urban X Black
Urban X Hispanic
Urban X Age 30+
Urban X High Select
Urban X Master's
Fraction Collective
Bargaining
Coll Barg X Male
Coll Barg X Black
Coll Barg X Hispanic
Coll Barg X Age 30+
Coll Barg X High Select
Coll Barg X Master's
Unemployment Rate
Unemp X Male
(Table A.1. continued)
1.305
(1.682)
0.681
(0.992)
1.817
(1.523)
-0.121
(0.069)
Unemp X Black
Unemp X Hispanic
Unemp X Age 30+
118
0.812
(1.835)
1.501
(0.935)
-2.987
(1.890)
0.786
(2.072)
0.469
(1.334)
0.571
(0.982)
0.720
(0.516)
2.363
(0.827)
-0.667
(1.316)
-0.893
(0.538)
1.000
(1.938)
1.472
(0.949)
-3.045
(1.871)
0.643
(2.039)
0.412
(1.334)
-1.104
(1.466)
-0.087
(1.443)
0.514
(1.003)
0.670
(0.508)
2.436
(0.827)
-0.772
(1.288)
-0.834
(0.548)
0.755
(0.689)
-0.063
(0.683)
1.645
(1.571)
0.147
(0.198)
0.553
(0.505)
0.937
(0.502)
-0.094
(0.227)
0.347
(0.248)
-0.165
(0.289)
-0.091
(0.077)
-0.059
(0.044)
-0.159
(0.120)
0.240
(0.092)
0.067
(0.058)
1.687
(1.508)
0.151
(0.194)
0.545
(0.501)
0.885
(0.486)
-0.101
(0.230)
-0.126
(0.076)
-0.053
(0.043)
-0.128
(0.116)
0.241
(0.091)
0.080
(0.057)
(Table A.1. continued)
Unemp X High Select -0.138
(0.079)
Unemp X Master's 0.020
(0.089)
Number of Individuals 6996 6996 6996
Notes: State characteristics are measured for each potential destination state, including the college state.
The values of distance and nonmigration for destination state k depend on college state j (see text for
variable definitions). The main effects of the teacher attributes drop out of the probability expression for
the conditional logit model. All specifications include state fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for
correlation within college state by survey year.
119
Table A.2. Conditional Logit Model Estimates of the Choice of Initial Teaching State
with Salary Mandate Dummy Variable (Law)
No Interactions
Law
Law X Male
Law X Black
Law X Hispanic
Law X Age 30+
Law X High Select
Law X Master's
Nonmigration
Nonmig X Male
Nonmig X Black
Nonmig X Hispanic
Nonmig X Age 30+
Nonmig X High Select
(1)
-0.078
(0.142)
3.199
(0.140)
Interactions with
Demographic
Attributes
(2)
-0.085
(0.159)
-0.182
(0.119)
0.530
(0.466)
-0.319
(0.353)
0.297
(0.246)
3.111
(0.140)
0.073
(0.145)
0.169
(0.331)
0.739
(0.464)
0.169
(0.175)
Nonmig X Master's
Distance (per 1,000 miles)
Dist X Male
-3.727
(0.307)
Dist X Black
Dist X Hispanic
Dist X Age 30+
Dist X High Select
Dist X Master's
Dist2 X Master's
Distance 2 (per 1,0002 miles 2)
Dist2 X Male
0.470
(0.115)
-3.783
(0.316)
0.274
(0.264)
-0.068
(0.746)
1.469
(0.779)
-0.330
(0.337)
0.486
(0.118)
-0.032
(0.061)
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Interactions with All
Attributes
(3)
-0.033
(0.163)
-0.194
(0.122)
0.598
(0.465)
-0.320
(0.370)
0.278
(0.242)
-0.022
(0.271)
-0.478
(0.285)
3.099
(0.144)
0.066
(0.142)
0.180
(0.327)
0.712
(0.468)
0.171
(0.173)
-0.277
(0.200)
-0.184
(0.256)
-4.095
(0.320)
0.288
(0.261)
0.0002
(0.749)
1.483
(0.774)
-0.176
(0.339)
1.444
(0.334)
0.051
(0.422)
-0.026
(0.096)
0.539
(0.115)
-0.036
(0.062)
(Table A.2. continued)
Dist2 X Black
Dist2 X Hispanic
Dist2 X Age 30+
Dist2 X High Select
Enrollment
(per 1,000,000 students)
Enroll X Male
Enroll X Black
Enroll X Hispanic
Enroll X Age 30+
Enroll X High Select
Enroll X Master's
Fraction Minority
Minority X Male
Minority X Black
Minority X Hispanic
Minority X Age 30+
Minority X High Select
Minority X Master's
Fraction Lunch
Lunch X Male
Lunch X Black
Lunch X Hispanic
Lunch X Age 30+
Lunch X High Select
Lunch X Master's
1.032
(0.637)
-4.180
(2.125)
-0.050
(0.200)
-0.554
(0.234)
0.043
(0.080)
0.967
(0.636)
0.056
(0.058)
0.274
(0.125)
0.134
(0.107)
-0.112
(0.071)
-4.437
(2.132)
-0.199
(0.497)
1.104
(1.075)
0.458
(1.300)
0.566
(0.542)
-0.059
(0.203)
-0.569
(0.244)
0.016
(0.080)
-0.268
(0.078)
0.902
(0.614)
0.061
(0.060)
0.304
(0.126)
0.156
(0.105)
-0.087
(0.067)
0.272
(0.082)
-0.070
(0.105)
-4.607
(2.173)
-0.152
(0.495)
1.059
(1.127)
0.559
(1.339)
0.504
(0.539)
-0.809
(0.772)
0.612
(0.739)
-1.207
(0.986)
0.426
(0.553)
2.874
(1.740)
1.198
(1.423)
0.315
(0.819)
-0.762
(0.787)
-2.321
(1.066)
-1.110
(0.873)
-1.513
(0.936)
0.487
(0.553)
2.779
(1.718)
1.290
(1.435)
0.267
(0.838)
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Graduation Rate
Grad Rate X Male
Grad Rate X Black
Grad Rate X Hispanic
Grad Rate X Age 30+
Grad Rate X High Select
Grad Rate X Master's
Fraction Urban
Urban X Male
Urban X Black
Urban X Hispanic
Urban X Age 30+
Urban X High Select
Urban X Master's
Fraction Collective
Bargaining
Coll Barg X Male
Coll Barg X Black
Coll Barg X Hispanic
Coll Barg X Age 30+
Coll Barg X High Select
Coll Barg X Master's
Unemployment Rate
Unemp X Male
(Table A.2. continued)
1.027 0.626
(1.830) (1.986)
1.233
(0.964)
-3.161
(2.032)
0.900
(2.157)
0.555
(1.346)
0.470
(0.977)
1.568
(1.612)
-0.117
(0.068)
Unemp X Black
Unemp X Hispanic
0.462
(1.008)
0.615
(0.594)
0.126
(1.285)
-0.346
(1.624)
0.83
-0.923
(0.637)
1.412
(1.607)
0.103
(0.190)
0.754
(0.441)
0.993
(0.540)
0.096
(0.266)
-0.125
(0.075)
-0.045
(0.042)
-0.206
(0.114)
0.263
(0.092)
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0.745
(2.083)
1.185
(0.963)
-3.103
(2.043)
0.805
(2.105)
0.542
(1.346)
-1.374
(1.414)
-0.513
(1.433)
0.499
(1.034)
0.606
(0.603)
0.092
(1.293)
-0.613
(1.606)
0.70
-0.997
(0.662)
-0.467
(0.785)
0.822
(0.848)
1.452
(1.672)
0.095
(0.192)
0.745
(0.445)
1.023
(0.554)
0.054
(0.265)
-0.147
(0.274)
-0.231
(0.317)
-0.087
(0.077)
-0.052
(0.042)
-0.245
(0.119)
0.258
(0.093)
(Table A.2. continued)
Unemp X Age 30+ 0.082 0.064
(0.053) (0.054)
Unemp X High Select -0.182
(0.074)
Unemp X Master's 0.059
(0.087)
Number of Individuals 6970 6970 6970
Notes: State characteristics are measured for each potential destination state, including the college state.
The values of distance and nonmigration for destination state k depend on college state j (see text for
variable definitions). The main effects of the teacher attributes drop out of the probability expression for
the conditional logit model. As salary mandate data is not available for the District of Columbia, teachers
who graduated friom or currently teach in DC have been omitted from specifications that include the law
dummy, and each teacher in these specifications faces a choice of fifty states. All specifications include
state fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for correlation within college state by survey year.
123
